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I. Introduction
German securities law, created by the enactment of the
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG or Securities Trading Act), is
one of the most recent of a large number of recent European
directives. This area of the law has been developing rapidly in
response to the grievances that have arisen from the recent stock
market boom. The first judgments have been delivered by the
courts of first instance, although the majority of cases have been
dismissed. The first successful penal' and civil2 actions have been
brought against noted companies such as Infomatec, EM.TV,
Met@box, and most recently, Comroad. The German legislature
has reacted by amending sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG.
These changes were implemented by the Fourth
Finanzmarktf'rderungsgesetz (FFG or Fourth Law for the
Promotion of the Capital Market).3 The new amendments to
German securities law introduce, for the first time, special liability
I See LG Munich I, 4 Kls 305 Js 52373/00 (2003) (deciding EM.TV's criminal
conviction on the basis of section 400 of the AktG), construed in 56 NJW 2328 (2003);
LG Munich I, 6 KLs 305 Js 34066/02 (2002) (deciding Comroad I).
2 LG Augsburg, 3 0 4995/00 (2001), 46 WM 1944 (2001), 1 BKR 99 (2001),
construed in Mrllers & Leisch, 1 BKR 78 (2001) = 22 ZIP 1881 (2001) = 16 NJW-RR
1705 (2001) = Schtifer, WuB I G 8.01 = Schwark, 17 EWiR 1049 (2001) (discussing
Infomatec II); LG Frankfurt on the Main, 3-7 0 43/02 (2003) (deciding Comroad IV);
LG Frankfurt on the Main, 3-7 0 47/02 (2003) (deciding Comroad V); LG Ingolstadt, 5
0 2239/02 (2003) (deciding Comroad VI). For more comprehensive details with regard
to this topic, see MOLLERS & ROTTER, AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT (2003).
3 4th Finanzmarktf'rrderungsgesetz (FFG) v. July 1, 2002 (BGBI . I. S.2010).
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for defective or omitted ad hoc communications.
These amendments, however, are only an intermediate step
4 
-
capital market law in Germany and the European Union is still
developing. The first judgments addressing liability claims are
about to be delivered by the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the highest
German Federal Court for civil actions.5 For the first time, the
BGH will give its opinion on whether boards of directors will be
personally liable with regard to incorrect ad hoc communications.6
Thus far, the BGH has affirmed corporate liability in three
judgments.7 In addition, the federal government plans to enhance
liability and information duties by means of a ten-point roadmap.8
The German federal government has also enacted the
Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz (AnSVG or Act Improving
Investor Protection),9 and has proposed an act addressing
representative proceedings with regard to investors
(Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz).° Finally, the Ministry
of Finance recently issued a draft for an act concerning capital
market information liability (Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungs-
gesetz, or KapInHaG).l"
4 See, e.g., Dreyling, 42 Die Bank 16 (2002) (discussing the development that led
up to the 4th FFG); Fleischer, 55 NJW 2977 (2002); Hutter & Leppert, 4 NZG 649
(2002); MOilers, in RWS-Forum: Bankrecht 2002, 271 (2002-2003); M6iler, 46 WM
2405 (2001).
5 An appeal was allowed and filed against the decision of OLG Munich, 30 U
855/01 (2002), NJW 2003, 144 WM 2003, 70 ZIP. 2002, 1989, construed in MOilers &
Leisch BKR 2002, 1096; Fuchs & Diihn, 2 BKR 1063 (2002) (Infomatec II). The
lawsuit changed from the eleventh (file no. X1 ZR 395/02) to the second senate (file no.
II ZR 402/02).
6 BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004) = 49 WM 1721 (2004)
= 57 NJW 2971 (2004); BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004) = 57
NJW 2664 (2004); BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP 1604 (2004), reviewed
in Haas, LMK 181 (2004); Leisch, 25 ZIP 1573 (2004); M6llers, 60 JZ Vol. 2 (2005).
7 BGH of July 19, 2004, I1 ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004) = 49 WM 1721
(2004)=57 NJW 2971 (2004).
8 Der Finanzmarktforderungsplan 2006 (scheme paper proposed Feb. 2, 2003, by
Federal Minister of Justice Zypries and Minister of Finance Eichel), available at
http://www.bmj.de, reviewed by Seibert, 57 BB 693 (2003).
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The European Union legislature is no less active, having
mandated that the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC, 2 issued
April 12, 2003, be implemented into domestic law of member
states no later than October 12, 2004. Amended proposals for
both the Prospect Directive 13 and the Transparency Directive of
March 26, 200314 have also been presented.
This paper seeks to provide an overview of the status of
information duties and ad hoc publicity, as well as to point out the
need for further legislative developments. Part II will address
information duties, while Part III will address liability claims. Part
IV provides a concluding summary of the contents of this Article.
II. Developments in Capital Markets Information Disclosure
Requirements
A. German and European Law Requirements - Market Abuse
Directive 2003/6/EC
1. Ad hoc Publicity
Ad hoc publicity is closely related to the insider law of section
14 of the WpHG. Inside facts, or facts that are not known to the
public, can no longer be abused if they are revealed to the public
pursuant to section 15 of the WpHG. Accordingly, ad hoc
publicity is the flipside of insider law in that it can legitimize
12 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC of Jan. 1, 2003 on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96), 16, [hereinafter
Market Abuse Directive], available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/search/search_oj.html, construed in Jesper Lau Hansen, The New Proposal for a
European Union Directive on Market Abuse, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 241 (2002).
13 Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or
Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC (Prospect Directive) of Aug.
9, 2002, COM(02) 460, [hereinafter Prospect Directive], available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-general/regdoc/recherche.cfin?CL=en.
14 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Harmonization of Transparency Requirements with Regard to Information about Issuers
Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending
Directive 2001/34/EC (Transparency Directive) of Mar. 27, 2003, COM(03) 138
[hereinafter Transparency Directive], available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
secretariat general/regdoc/recherche.cfm?CL=en.
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insider information for use. 5
a) Qualifications of Ad hoc Publicity
Article 6, paragraph 1 of European Union Market Abuse
Directive 2003/6/EC perpetuates the rationale of WpHG by
requiring member states to "ensure that issuers of financial
instruments inform the public as soon as possible of inside
information which directly concerns the said issuer. ' 16  This
provision addresses the term "inside information," which is legally
defined in Article 1, paragraph 1:
'Inside information' shall mean information of a precise nature
which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly,
to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more
financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would
be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those
financial instruments or on the price of related derivative
financial instruments. 1
7
The Market Abuse Directive aligns ad hoc publicity with
insider law. Several constituent facts which previously had been
independently defined for ad hoc publicity are not rendered
obsolete, 18 including the terms "information," "new .... occurrence
in the area of operations of the issuer," and "impact on the estate
and financial situation or the general business operations. ''1 9
While the term "fact" was used under previous law, Article 1,
paragraph 1 of the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC now
replaces the term "fact" with the term "precise information."
Article 2 of the European Securities Commission's (ESC) proposal
15 2d FFG, Begr. RegE, BT-Drs. 12/6679, at 35, 48, (previously Hopt & Will,
Europaisches Insiderrecht (1973)); Hopt, WM-Festgabe Hellner pp. 29, 31 (1994);
Bankrechtstag 1995, 3, 21 (1996); Kimpel, in WpHG, § 15 n.6 (2d ed. 1999).
16 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 12, art. 6, para. 1.
17 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
18 Article 20 of the Market Abuse Directive provides for the avoidance of double
regulation of the publication duties by abolishing the duty of ad hoc publicity now
stipulated in Article 68, paragraph 1 Directive 2001/34/EC (of the European Parliament
and of the Council of May 28, 2001, on the Admission of Securities to Official Stock
Exchange Listing and on Information to be Published on those Securities - Capital
Market Publicity Directive 2001/34/EC = OJ L 184, 1, amended in O.J. (L 217), 18)
[hereinafter Capital Market Publicity Directive].
19 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 12.
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defines "precise information" as:
[A]ny information consisting of a matter or an event which is
true or could reasonably be expected to become true in the
future, when this information is specific enough to allow a
conclusion to be drawn about its possible impact on prices of
financial instruments or related derivate financial instruments.
20
Under the Market Abuse Directive, past events must be made
revisable, and forward looking statements must be sufficiently
likely. Thus, certain prognoses are likely to fall within the scope
of the term "precise information," if they are sufficiently likely to
come true.2' By the same token, plans, schemes, and strategies
must be revealed to the public, regardless of whether they have
previously been disclosed in a perceivable way.
Section 15, paragraph 1 of the WpHG stipulates that the event
must have occurred within the purview of the issuer's operations.
Thus, the duty to reveal information to the public is extended only
to the extent that the new definition demands that the information
relates "directly or indirectly" to the issuer. Information that
relates to the issuer of financial instruments or to a financial
instrument indirectly is referred to by the proposal as information
that is apt to influence the development and formation of prices on
a regulated market (such as a terrorist attack).22 Furthermore,
listed subsidiaries will have to reveal events in the area of
operations of the non-listed parent company, provided that the
information affects the subsidiary directly and so long as there is
potential to affect the subsidiary's market price. In addition,
establishing causation between the possible effects and the effects
on the market price is no longer necessary, because the
amendments dropped the requirement of a showing of an "impact
on the estate and financial situation or the general business
operations." Therefore, changes in dividend payments and buy-
20 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/124/EC of 24 December 2003
on Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as
Regards the Definition and Public Disclosure of Inside Information and the Definition of
Market Manipulation, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 70 [hereinafter Definitions and Public
Disclosure Directive], available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search
_oj.html, construed in Grimme & von Buttlar, 48 WM 901, 906 (2003).
21 This includes public forecasts of the company's developments by the board of
directors.
22 11 th Reason, Parliament Draft, 13 ZBB 144, 150 (2002).
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back programs, as well as changes of the listings, must now be
revealed. The impact that the said changes to the provision will
bring about has yet to be examined comprehensively.
Nevertheless, as this Article argues, a massive broadening of the
scope of the required duty of ad hoc publicity is needed.
Additionally, the structure of the exception to this law has
been revised. Prior to the Market Abuse Directive, it was up to the
supervisory body to decide whether an issuer was exempt from the
duty of ad hoc publicity. Now, pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2
of the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC, the issuer may defer
the publication of inside information at his sole discretion, if the
publicity impairs his legitimate interests. 23  This change to the
exception rule is now in line with the legal positions held of the
United States, France, and Switzerland.24  The same change of
paradigm is also seen in European anti-trust law. Under Articles
81, 82, and 83 of the EC Executive Regulation No. 1/2003, the
previous prohibition with the possibility of exemptions was
transformed into a legal exception.25 Ostensibly, this decreases the
workload of the supervisory body. But, it will significantly
increase the liability risk for companies if the ad hoc
communication is omitted, since the company has the burden of
determining for itself whether it is eligible for exemption.
b) Procedure for Publication
The procedure for publication in Germany is a three-stage
process.26  First, the ad hoc communication is disclosed to the
23 Furthermore, this omission must not be apt to mislead the public and the issuer
has to be capable of safeguarding the confidentiality of the information. See Market
Abuse Directive, supra note 12.
24 See Company Manual of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), § 202.06(A),
at http://www.nyse.com; Law No. 98-07 of Mar. 2, 1999, J.0. Mar. 2, 1999, art. 4,
available at http://www.cob.fr; Art. 72 Kotierungsreglement, at http://www.swx.com;
see also FORHoFF, KAPITALMARKTRECHTLICHE AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT ZUR VERMEIDUNG
VON INSIDERKRIMINALITAT 143 (2000); K6ndgen, in FESTSCHRIFT DRUEY, 791, 792
(2002).
25 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16.12.2002, on the Implementation of
the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2002 O.J. (L
1), 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi.
26 Geibel in, WPHG, BORsG, VERKAUFSPROSPEKTG, § 15, 121 (1999). For the
channels of disclosure for other company-related information, see Baums & Theodor,
Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental Europe: the Example of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, (BAFin or
Federal Supervisory Body for Financial Services) and to the
management of the stock exchanges.27 Next, the actual publication
takes place.28 Finally, the wording of the published ad hoc
communication is conveyed to the managements of the stock
exchanges and to the BAFin.29
Section 15, paragraph 3, subsection 1 of the WpHG obliges the
issuer to undertake publication in at least one national newspaper
authorized by the stock exchanges in Germany or in an electronic
information system 3° in German. The communication may be
simultaneously published in English. The electronic information
system should be directed at institutional professional market
participants3 rather than the general public. One such available
electronic system is operated by Deutsche Gesellschaft ffir Ad hoc-
Publizitdit mbH (DGAP).32 The DGAP immediately uploads the
communications onto the Internet, but the DGAP does not publish
the communications on teletext. However, there are numerous
competing service providers that publish ad hoc
communications. 3 Moreover, ad hoc communications can be
found in the teletext systems of the German public television
stations ARD and ZDF.34 Technical problems, however, became
evident during a recent inquiry.35 None of the service providers
Germany (2002), ECGI Law Working Paper No. 04/2002, 15, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstractid=345020.
27 WpHG, § 15, para. 2.
28 Id. § 15, para. 3.
29 Id. § 15, para. 4.
30 Kreditwesengesetz (KWG), § 53, para. 1.
31 2d FFG, Resolution Reference and Report of the Financial Committee, BT-Drs.
12/7918, 101.
32 In the summer of 1996, Reuter Direct, the Vereinigten Wirtschaftsdienste GmbH
(VWD), as well as the Deutsche B6rse AG merged to found this service. See DGAP,
available at http://www.dgap.de (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); Ktimpel, supra note 15,
n.156, 159(b); Geibel, supra note 26, n. 140.
33 See, e.g., N-TV, http://www.n-tv.de (last visited Oct. 25, 2004);
http://www.euroadhoc.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); VWD, http://www.vwd.de (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004).
34 See M61lers/Ganten, 27 ZGR 773, 799 (1998) (discussing the teletexts of e.g.
ARD and ZDF p. 718).
35 Regarding an inquiry of Monday, Aug. 11, 2003.
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had available all ad hoc communications," and numerous
providers only offered obsolete communications on their pages.37
This finding is particularly problematic, as company information
should be disclosed to the public without delay. Germany has
since made most of the necessary revisions in order to conform
with the publication procedure under European law.
The European Community Listing Directive 79/279/ECC38
requires the publication of ad hoc communications in a national
newspaper or an equivalent means acknowledged by a competent
body. The public is intended to refer to the "general public. 39
Article 6, paragraph 1, subsection 2 of the Abuse Directive
2003/6/EC also stipulates that inside information subject to
publication must be published on the Internet site of the issuer.4"
In Great Britain,4 the issuer must immediately publish
"announcements of price-sensitive information" through a special
agency, The Regulatory Information Service. In contrast to
German law, no so-called "sphere of publicity"
(Bereichs6ffentlichkeit) is to be established thereby; in fact, the
precept of equal treatment of all investors applies.43  Swiss law
36 DGAP did not publish the ad hoc-communication of uzin Utz AG of Aug. 11,
2003, on their website. N-TV, http://www.n-tv.de (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
37 No ad hoc communications of Aug. 11, 2003 could be found. Hugin,
http://www.huginonline.de (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); VWD, http://www.vwd.de (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004); teletexts of ARD and ZDF p. 718.
38 Council Directive of Mar. 5, 1979 coordinating the conditions for the admission
of securities to official stock exchange (79/279/ECC) - Stock Exchange Admissions
Directive 79/279/ECC = O.J. (L 66) 21.
39 The Capital Market Publicity Directive, supra note 18, adopted this meaning of
the term "public" from Articles 68 and 102, paragraph 1 of the Stock Exchange
Admissions Directive, supra note 38.
40 Incidentally, the obligation to publish the ad hoc communication in a national
newspaper or comparable medium remains, as the Market Abuse Directive did not repeal
Article 102 of the Capital Market Publicity Directive.
41 More comprehensive comparative law aspects addresses to ad hoc publicity can
be found in MOLLERS & ROTTER, supra note 2, §§ 5-6 (2003).
42 Ad hoc communications are listed in Schedule 12 of the Listing Rules, at
http//www.fsa.goof/pubs/ukla/schedulel2-3.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); see also
Joyce et al., Practising Law Institute 2001, No. BO-0162 (2001) (detailing an older
scheme of ad hoc publicity duties).
43 See Williams, FSA 's Disclosure Regime for Listed Companies, at
http://www.fsa.goofitk/pubs/speeches/sp.90.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). But the
fact that small investors receive the information on the Internet with a twenty minute
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 30
also expressly provides that the equal treatment of market
participants be observed as far as possible when publishing ad hoc
communications. 4' Likewise, Austrian law provides for the
publishing of ad hoc communications through electronic
information systems; there is no limitation to professional
investors.45 In Italy, ad hoc communications are sent to two news
agencies,46 again without a limitation on the sphere of publicity.
In the United States, all reports filed on the EDGAR system
(Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) have to be
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).4 7
EDGAR reports are accessible to the general public through the
Internet and can also be retrieved on the SEC homepage.48 In
France, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB)
4 9
demands the equal treatment of investors5" with regard to the
promulgation of the information; there is no limitation on the
delay has been criticized. See HANNIGAN, INSIDER DEALING 194 (2D ed. 1994);
WALDHAUSEN, DIE AD HOC-PUBLIZITATSPFLICHTIGE TATSACHE 98 (2002).
44 Kotierungsreglement, art. 72 (4), supra note 24.
45 B6rseG, § 82 (8), at http://www.fma.gofat (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
46 Art. 66 para. 1 lit. b) Reg. Ad hoc-publicity is found in Art. 114 - 116, 118 Testo
Unico (T.U).; see SANGIOVANNI, DIE AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT IM DEUTSCHEN UND
ITALIENISCHEN RECHT 173 (2003).
47 The issuer of securities subject to registration is obliged to publish reports as
demanded by the regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78 (2003). The SEC issued Rule 13a- 11, on
the basis of this authorization, which prescribed a current publication duty using the form
8-K vorschrieb ("current reports"). See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 420 (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act now introduces a general duty of ad
hoc-publicity by Section 13 (1) of the SEA that reads:
Real Time Issuer Disclosures - Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or
15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional
information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations
of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative
information and graphic presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule,
is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the public interest.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 409 (2003).
48 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, at http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2004).
49 COB and Conseil des marchds financiers (CMF) merged to become L'Autorit6
des marches financiers Loi de sdcuritds financi~re du Ir aofit 2003.
50 Paris 10 septembre 1996, RJDA 12/96, n 1487 (regarding the violation of the
principle of equal treatment).
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sphere of publicity. Moreover, the issuer must submit all
information subject to publication to the COB before, or
simultaneously with, the publication as pursuant to R~glement no.
98-07.51 In order to create comprehensive and simultaneous
information for all investors, these ad hoc communications are
published on the Internet using the SOPHIE database (Site Ouvert
des Publications Historiques des Entreprises).52
One area where German securities law has yet to functionally
comply with European law is the present limitation of ad hoc
publicity to professional investors only. This so-called "sphere of
publicity" infringes upon the principle of equal treatment of
investors and does not adequately and equitably disseminate
information to all investors in the general public.53  The
Commission concurs with this opinion. 4 Thus, it is surprising that
the legislature, amending section 10, paragraph 3, number 2 of the
Wertpapieribernahmegesetz (WpUG or Securities Take-over Act)
on January 1, 2002, again only referred to the sphere of publicity
with regards to the publication of a take-over, while the WpUG in
contrast stresses the principle of equal treatment in section 3,
paragraph 1." Legal scholars have been trying to qualify this
problem. Most scholars contend that the incorrect implementation
of the directive has been rendered obsolete by its actual
development; the quick publication of facts on the Internet has
resulted in adequate notice to the general public.56 Yet, this
51 Law No. 98-07 of Mar. 2, 1999, J.O. Mar. 2, 1999, art. 8 (stating that a public
disclosure document "is to be forwarded to the COB not later than the time of
publication"), available at http://www.cob.fr (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
52 AMF, at http://www.cob.fr/frset.asp?rbrq=sophie (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
53 HIRTE, BANKRECHTSTAG 1995, 47, 66, 67; Milers, 26 ZGR 334, 359 (1997);
MOilers & Leisch, 1 BKR 78, 80 (2001); MOilers, in Horn & Krdmer eds., RWS-Forum.
Bankrecht 2002, 217 (2003); BLIESENER, AUFSICHTSRECHTLICHE VERHALTENSPFLICHTEN
BEIM WERTPAPIERHANDEL 231 (1998); GRUNDMANN, EUROPAISCHES
SCHULDVERTRAGSRECHT 4.21, n.33 (1999); GEHRT, DIE NEUE AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT NACH §
15 WPHG 201 (1997); VON KLITZING, DIE AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT 53 (1999).
54 According to the Commission's opinion, the information is to be disclosed
simultaneously and actually to the investors if selective disclosure of information during
the regular business occurs. The reasons for the EC-Commission's proposal is found in
the Directive on Insider Dealings and Market Manipulation, Parliamentary Draft, 13
ZBB 144, 152 (2002).
55 WpOG, § 3, para. 1.
56 See Kilmpel, supra note 15; Geibel supra note 26; Ftirhoff &Wblk, 42 WM 449,
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opinion contains two misconceptions. First, pointing to the act of
publishing is not helpful unless all ad hoc communication can be
found there. Second, the prevailing case law of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) indicates that even if the actual method of
publication in a member state is in accordance with the directive,
implementation is still rendered insufficient if the language of the
actual law of the member state does not suggest such an
interpretation.
For reasons of legal certainty, citizens of European Union
member states may demand that European law be incorporated
into the codification of domestic law. The initial version of
section 15, paragraph 3, number 2 of the WpHG was inconsistent
with European Law. De legeferenda, only electronic information
systems are to be employed to disseminate information, and the
limitation of diffusion to only financial institutes and other
professional investors is to be deleted. In response to this
inconsistency, the German legislature has since reacted by
removing the limitation to the sphere of publicity. A regulation
(yet to be enacted) will define manner, scope, and form of required
publication.57 It remains to be seen whether the necessary legal
conditions to ensure investor equality can finally be achieved with
the enactment of this regulation.
2. Directors' Dealing
Directors' dealing can now be found in Article 6, paragraph 4
of the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC.58 With the newly
created section 15a of the WpHG, the German legislature now
requires that board members, members of supervisory bodies, and
their immediate relatives to inform the issuer and the BAFin as
soon as possible after they acquire or sell shares of their own
company.59 Knowledge of such transactions can be of great
451 (1997); Grimme & von Buttlar, 48 WM 901, 907 (2003) (playing down the problem
of the incorrect implementation of the directive); Hirte, in KK zum WpOG, § 10 n. 67
(2003).
57 WpHG, § 15(7); BT-Drs. 15/3493 of July 1, 2004, supra note 9, at S: 1, 21.
58 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 12, art. 6, para. 4.
59 WpHG, § 15a. See also the circular of the BAFin of June 27, 2002 as to the
duties of disclosure and publication pursuant to § 15a of the WpHG, at 4 NZG 711
(2002), available at http://www.bafin.de.; Schneider, 56 BB 1817 (2002); Schneider, 46
AG 473 (2002).
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importance for the market, as it provides indications of
management's assessment of the company's future business
outlook.6 ° Furthermore, the semblance of a covert abuse of a
knowledge margin is eliminated.6 The provision mirrors section
16 of the Securities Exchange Act (SEA), which governs U.S.
directors and their self-interested dealings.
Despite the efforts of the legislature,62  however, the
priovision's wording does not correspond to the language of the
European directive. The possibility of easy evasion and the
avoidance of sanctions has been criticized under the current
German law.63 The Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC is not
confined to immediate relatives, but refers to persons closely
associated with them. Nor is there a E 25,000 notification
threshold at the European level. The German legislature reacted
with the enactment of the Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz, and
thereby lowered the notification threshold to C 5,000.64
3. Analysts'Duties
According to Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Market Abuse
Directive, member states have to make sure that information
spread publicly by analysts is "fairly presented."65 Any conflicts
of interests also must be revealed.66  Section 34b, paragraph 1,
subsection 1 of the WpHG, introduced by the Fourth FFG,
stipulates that security analyses are to be undertaken with the
"necessary experience, diligence, and consciousness.,,6' This
general clause (which could hitherto also be found in section 31,
paragraph 1 of the WpHG) is broader, and therefore less precise,
60 See Insiderdaten, http://www.insiderdaten.de (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
61 4 tb FFG, Reasons Government Draft, BT-Drs. 14/8017, 88.
62 See M6llers, 57 JZ 121, 128 (2002); 45 WM 2284, 2293 (2000).
63 Posegga, 2 BKR 687, 698 (2002) (appropriately criticizes the fact that an
investor would have to search countless websites due to the lack of a central information
platform). Publication on the DGAP-website is voluntary. DGAP, http://www.dgap.de
(last visited Oct. 25, 2004); see also Hutter & Leppert, 4 NZG 649, 656 (2002); Schuster,
167 ZHR 193, 206 (2003).
64 WpHG, § 15a, para. 1(2); BT-Drs. 15/3493 of July 1, 2004, supra note 9, at S:1,
21.
65 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 12, art.6, para.5.
66 Id.
67 WpHG, § 34b, para. 1(1).
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than the wording of the European provision. Nor does the German
BAFin bulletin indicate what is to be considered a "fair
presentation" of securities.68 A specification should be made
immediately, as such duty did not exist until now, and needs to be
clarified. Also, further incompatibility with European law should
be prevented. 69  The German legislature has responded, in a
limited way, by stating that analyses are to be created and
presented in a manner which demands the disclosure of conflicts
of interests.70
B. Procedural Reporting Requirements - The Proposal for a
Transparency Directive of March 26, 2003
A proposal for a new Transparency Directive, introduced on
March 26, 2003, by the EC Commission, is designed to achieve
both community-wide uniform transparency and create a level of
information that will protect investors, and promote market
effeciency.7"
1. Improvements in Annual Reporting Requirements
At the European level, the European Community has adopted a
proposal7 2 to introduce the International Accounting Standards
(lAS) to member states.7 3 In comparison to German accounting
68 The BAFin bulletin's construction of several terms in § 34 b of the WpHG of
Mar. 7, 2003, does not go into para. 1.§ 1.
69 As to the problem of implementing European directives by means of general
clauses see W.H. Roth, Generalklauseln im Europiischen Recht, in: FS DROBNIG, 135
(1998) in FS 50 Jahre BGH 847, 871. As to the insufficient implementation of the
Standard Business conditions Directive 93/13/EEC by § 9 AGBG with respect to the
prior law, see Staudinger, 44 WM 1546, 1552 (1999); Leible, 12 EuZW 438, 439 (2001);
MOLLERS, ROLE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 20 (2003).
70 WpHG, § 34b, para. 1; BT-Drs. 15/3493 of July 1, 1994, supra note 9, at S: 1,
21.
71 Transparency Directive, supra note 14, at 3.
72 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) asked to amend the
4th and 7t' Company Law EC-Directives. See Claussen, 73 AG 278, 279 (1993);
Havermann, in FS Moxter 656, 668 (1994). As to the restriction of balance rights, see
BUSSE VON COLBE, MANAGEMENTKONTROLLE DURCH RECHNUNGSLEGUNGSPFLICHTEN,
VORTRAG ZUR VERLEHUNG DER EHRENDOKTORWORDE DER UNIVERSITAT AUGSBURG 17,
28 (1994).
73 The International Accounting Standards have been frequently revised by the
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), which is organized under private law.
[Vol. 30
2004] GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 293
standards, there are far fewer options. The recently amended IAS-
regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 replaces the fourth and seventh
company law directives of the JAS by 2005; the principles of
maintenance of capital are thereby vastly restrained.7 4 The draft of
the Transparency Directive states that, for the annual accounts and
the semi-annual reports, the guidelines of the IAS are to be
observed according to Regulation No. 1606/2002/EC. 75 According
to Article 4, number 2, the annual financial reports must consist of
the audited annual financials, management reports, and a
declaration by a competent body that the information contained in
the annual reports corresponds to the facts and that the reports are
free from material omissions. This declaration is similar to the
recently adopted Sarbanes-Oxley-Act 76 in that the declaration
requires the board of directors to attest to the accuracy of the
annual reports.
2. Semi-Annual Reporting Requirements
Article 5 of the Transparency Directive draft creates an
issuer's duty to publish a semi-annual report, governed by the IAS.
This semi-annual report must contain abbreviated financials, an
update of the previous management report contained in the annual
report, and the declaration by a competent body as to the accuracy
of the facts contained within the semi-annual report.77
3. Quarterly Reporting Requirements
The proposal that companies disclose particular financial
information for the first and third quarter was recently introduced
in Europe. 8 The fact that eight member states79 have already
See International Accounting Standards Board, at http://www.iasb.org.uk (last visited
Oct. 20, 2004).
74 Commission Regulation 1606/2002/EC of 19 July 2002 Concerning the
Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1. Contra Schdn,
Editoral, 166 ZHR 1 (2002); WPg-Sonderheft 2001, 74; Niehues, WPg, 1209 (2001);
Ruhnke et al., 2 StuB 876 (2000).
75 See Transparency Directive, supra note 14, arts. 4-5.
76 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 409 (2003); Lanfermann & Maul, 54 DB
1725 (2002); Lanfermann & Maul, 55 DB 349 (2003).
77 See Transparency Directive, supra note 14, art. 5.
78 Id. art. 6. The government commission Corporate Governance (Baums-
Commission) asks that all listed companies in terms of § 3 para. 2 AktG, whose
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introduced such duties for all or particular regulated markets
supports harmonization of the duty to report quarterly. In
Germany, for example, several private law regulations provide for
a duty to report quarterly that exceeds the legal duty to report
annually.8 ° Furthermore, introducing a community-wide uniform
quarterly information duty will move towards harmonization with
the U.S. provisions, which have required quarterly reporting since
1946.81
Yet, the introduction of a duty to produce a quarterly report is
not without criticism. 82  For example, Porsche AG left M-DAX
because of high costs and the influence of seasonally specific
influences on the data provided by the reports. By discriminating
between Prime Standard and General Standard, the latter not
providing for quarterly reports, it is up to the companies to decide
which information duties and costs they deem appropriate. As the
discrimination of the two market segments is quite
straightforward, the investor would be sufficiently informed about
the different levels of information available through either
segment.8
3
The European Commission has partially addressed these
concerns by significantly reducing the extent of the publication
duty. In contrast to the interim report duty, the quarterly reports
do not have to be based on the IAS principles, instead, a scheduled
listing of net yields and operating profit after tax is sufficient. In
addition, information about the projected development of the
issuer is voluntary.
securities are dealt with on a regulated market (§ 2 Abs. 5 WpHG), obligatorily publish
quarter reports for the first three quarters of a financial year, Baums (ed)., Bericht der
Regierungskommission "Corporate Governance" of July 10, 2001, BT-Drs. 14/7515, n.
270.
79 These are Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
80 This applies to the (DAX-30 und M-DAX), Tec-DAX, SMAX and presents rules
of the New Market. See § 2 digit 7.1 Regelwerk Neuer Markt. Hanft & Kretschmer, 45
AG 84 (2001); Baums, Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental
Europe: The Example of Germany, Law Working Paper No.4, 7 (2002), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstract-id=345020 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
81 See Transparency Directive, supra note 14; see also Merkt & G6thel, 49 RIW 23
(2003).
82 See, e.g., SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Mar. 25, 2003, at 20.
83 See also Merkt Gutachten Gfir den 64. DJT, 100 (2002).
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4. Disclosure Requirements for Changes in Important
Shareholdings
Sections 21 - 26 of the WpHG now require noted companies
to disclose changes in important shareholdings,84 thereby
preventing the abuse of inside information.85 Disclosure duties
occur when certain shareholding thresholds are exceeded (i.e. 5%,
10%, 25%, 50%, 75%).86 Pursuant to section 21, paragraph 1 of
the WpHG, both the seller and the purchaser must inform the
company and the BAFin of the transaction.87 Moreover, the listed
company, whose shares are traded, must publish this information
in a national newspaper authorized by the stock exchanges.88
At the EC level, the proposed Transparency Directive includes
additional shareholding thresholds of 15%, 20%, and 30%. This is
in response to several member states having introduced new
thresholds along with the fact that only three member states have
reached the transparency standards established by the EC.89
Furthermore, the time limits within which the information has to
be forwarded have been shortened under the Transparency
Directive.
5. Procedural Publication Requirements
With respect to ad hoc publicity, member states can determine
the publication modalities on a national level, pursuant to the still-
valid provision of Article 102, paragraph 1 of the Capital Market
Publicity Directive 2001/34/EC. This has led to an enormous
variation of information channels so that, in several member
states, information about the same issuer is not available from a
particular source. This is in stark contrast with the EDGAR
system used in the United States and the SOPHIE database
introduced by the French COB supervisory agency, both of which
provide easy and central access to all issuer information.9 ° While
84 WpHG, §§ 21-26.
85 2d FFG (concerning WpHG, § 21).
86 Id.
87 WpHG, § 21, para. 1.
88 WpHG, § 25, para. 1.
89 Id.
90 See supra Part II.A. 1.
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the Market Abuse Directive only obliges the issuer to publish ad
hoc communications, Article 18 of the proposed Transparency
Directive goes a step further by requiring the respective
supervisory bodies to create guidelines making all information
relevant to the investors (as derived from the Prospect, Market
Abuse, and Transparency Directives) accessible on an electronic
platform. The long-term goal is to consolidate and enlarge these
electronic platforms to create a community-wide platform for all
European Capital Markets investors' information. So far, the
BAFin does not offer a German system compatible with such a
platform. 9' By implementing a uniform platform, problems arising
from information deficiencies would likely be remedied.92




Often, European directives concerning capital markets law
make no mention of sanctions.93 In the cases where sanctions are
referred to, it is only said that they are to be "appropriate '94 and
"sufficient to promote compliance"95  with the respective
provisions. 96  Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Market Abuse
Directive now provides a more precise framework, obliging the
91 The information concerning the links to the ad hoc communications is
incomplete as well. It lacks information on http://www.n-tv.de (last visited Oct. 20,
2004) and http://www.vwd.de (last visited Oct. 20, 2004), respectively.
92 See supra Part II.A. 1.
93 See, e.g., Stock Exchange Admissions Directive 79/279/EEC of Mar. 16, 1979,
O.J. (L 66) 21; Stock Exchange Admissions Prospectus Directive 80/390/EEC of Mar.
17, 1980, O.J. (L 100) 1; Interim Reports Directive 82/121/EEC of Feb. 15, 1982, O.J. (L
48) 26; Art. 7-18 et se Issue Prospectus Directive 89/298/EEC of Apr. 17, 1989, O.J. (L
124)8.
94 See, e.g., art. 15 Shareholding Transparency Directive 88/627/EEC of December
17, 1988, O.J. (L 348) 62; Capital Market Publicity Directive, supra note 18, art. 97.
95 Capital Market Publicity Directive, supra note 18, art. 97.
96 Art. 13 Insider Directive 89/592/ECC of Nov. 13, 1989, O.J. (L 224) 30; Art. 16
of the Proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning Take-over
Bids [hereinafter Proposal for a Take-over Directive] of Oct. 2, 2002, ErR. PARL. Doc.
(COM 534).
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member states to impose administrative sanctions which are
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. But, the directive
abandons private law sanctions as the EC lacks the necessary
enforcement power.
9 7
2. Private Law Liability
By introducing the Product Liability Directive 85/374/ECC,
the EC asserted its legislative power by introducing private law
liability claims some twenty years ago.98 Therefore, the argument
that private law sanctions have been abandoned due to the EC's
lack of legislative competence is not convincing.99 The argument
has been rendered even more unworkable due to the fact that the
EC has proposed private law liability for false or misleading
prospectuses. 100  Private law liability is even more
comprehensively dealt with in the Transparency Directive.
According to the Transparency Directive, member states must
introduce a private law establishing personal liability if they fail to
comply with their duties to publish annual, semi-annual, and
quarterly reports. 10 1  With respect to major shareholding
transparency, the Transparency Directive proposal leaves it up to
97 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 12, art. 14.
98 See Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985, O.J. (L 210) 29.
To establish equal competition conditions and customers' protection member states
resort to their own laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning liability
for defective products.
99 M6llers, 14 ZBB 390, 396 - 397 (2003); see also Btiche, Die Neuregelung der
Pflicht zur Ad hoc-Publizitdt im Zuge der Vollendung des Binnenmarktes flir
Finanzdienstleistungen, Diss. Augsburg at 222 (2004).
100 Capital Market Publicity Directive, supra note 18, art. 6, para. 2, states that:
"Member States shall ensure that their laws, regulation and administrative provisions on
civil liability applies to those persons responsible for the information given in a
prospectus." Id. Criwell, 47 AG 243, 252 (2003) (contending that this is a success of
German efforts).
101 See Transparency Directive, supra note 14, art. 7
1. Member States shall ensure that responsibility for the information to be
drawn up and to be made public in accordance with Articles 4, 5 and 6 lies with
the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies. 2. Member
States shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on
civil liability apply to those persons responsible for the information disclosed to
the public in accordance with Articles 4, 5 and 6.
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the member states to decide whether to introduce administrative or
private law sanctions."' In addition, private law liability for
defective ad hoc communications is expected to be introduced in
the recently amended Market Abuse Directive because the
proposal for a Transparency Directive proposal does not expressly
address ad hoc publicity.
10 3
B. Foundations of Liability
1. The Legal Nature of Capital Market Information
Due to the limited number of European company defaults, the
foundations of liability for defective capital market information
are poorly secured and, in some cases, highly controversial. In
addition, there is some dispute as to whether liability should be
grounded in tort or contract law.
a) Stock Exchange Prospectuses and Take-Over Bids
The question of whether claims based on violations of capital
market information duties are based on tort law or whether they
constitute a breach of contract has not yet been examined
comprehensively. The precept that strict liability, according to
contractual principle, requires a contractual obligation was eroded
early on in German law by the recognition of culpa in
contrahendo.m 4 Later, this newly introduced liability in quasi-
contractual relations was gradually expanded by recognizing
contracts with protective effects toward third persons (Vertrag mit
Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter), solicitor liability
(Sachwalterhaftung), and general private-law prospectus liability.
These were eventually codified in section 311, paragraphs 2 and 3
of the BGB.
The legal situation remains unclear with respect to stock
exchange liability. Arguments have been made that liability is
based on both tort and contract law.'0 5 The legal situation is more
102 See id. art. 24, para. 1.
103 See id. no. 5.3.4.
104 Cf RG of Apr. 26, 1912, 11 JW 743 Nr. 5 (1912).
105 If one accepts the tort law approach, then there is a discrepancy to the
jurisprudence of the BGH as to the general private law prospectus liability. According to
the BGH, it is derived from a liability for general reliance, therefore it is regarded as an
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clear regarding liability for defective bidding documents pursuant
to section 12 of the Wp(JG. Contractual obligations arise from the
publication of the bidder's offer; these obligations include
information duties for those responsible for the bid. For example,
the duty to inform exhaustively and correctly pursuant to section
11, paragraph 1, subsection 3 of the WpUG. Therefore, this is
unambiguously a case of liability for a violation of pre-contractual
duties. Nevertheless, the damages provision of section 12 of the
WpUG does not require proof of personal reliance on the part of
the injured party °6 because such reliance regularly does not exist.
Instead, the legislature deems it sufficient that the bidding
documents typically promote reliance.
b) Ad hoc Communications and Periodical
Communications
The rationale for general contractual reliance does not fit
smoothly with ad hoc communications, because securities law is
primarily directed towards the sale and acquisition of securities.
Accordingly, one cannot ignore the fact that information duties
pursuant to section 15 of the WpHG may be of a different nature
than those imposed under securities disclosure requirements. As
the obligatory prospectus is associated with a placement of
securities, it follows that, at least in part, this prospectus also
functions to boost sales of securities. This association does not
exist with the recently introduced liability for defective ad hoc
communications pursuant to sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG.
The circle of persons entitled to bring a claim is restricted to those
who actually enter into a security transaction with the shares at
issue. This limitation on potential claimants would not be logical
enhancement of culpa in contrahendo. See BGH of Apr. 24, 1978, 71 BGHZ 284, 287
(1978); BGH of Nov. 16, 1978, 72 BGHZ 382, 387 (1978); BGH of May 22, 1980, 77
BGHZ 172, 175 (1980); BGH of Oct. 6, 1980, 79 BGHZ 337, 341 (1980); ASSMANN &
SCHGTZE, HANDBUCH DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS § 7 n. 20 (2d ed. 1997); SCHAFER,
WPHG, BORsG, VERKPROsPG §§ 45, 46 (B6rsG previous version n. 23) (1997); GERKE
& STEINER, HANDWORTERBUCH DES BANK- UND FINANZWESENS 1736 (3d ed. 2001);
GROB, KAPITALMARKTRECHT §§ 45, 46 (B6rsG n. 4) (2d ed. 2002); EBENROTH ET AL.,
HGB, BankR IX, n. 170 (2001); SCHWARK, BORSG, §§ 45, 46 n. 2 (2d ed. 1994);
VORTMANN, PROSPEKTHAFTUNG uND ANLAGEBERATUNG § 1 n. 72 (2002). Admittedly, it
is of little practical importance to discuss the legal nature of liability. See SCHWARK,
supra §§ 45, 46 n..4.
106 See KOLNER KOMMENTARZ. WPUG, § 12 n. 4 (2002).
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unless liability is based on the existence of a quasi-contractual
relationship, such as the one that exists between the parties to a
securities instrument. An argument against qualifying sections 37
and 37c of the WpHG as provisions belonging to the quasi-
contractual sphere is the fact that the legislature of the second FFG
sought to construct section 15 of the WpHG as a purely public law
provision.1 °7
The approach taken in proceeding from one valuation of
similarity to a further valuation of similarity, and thereby positing
a quasi-contractual liability for ad hoc communications,
contradicts the strict distinction between tort and contractual
liability in German law. It should, therefore, be rejected.'18
Sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG are thus tort provisions.
10 9
2. A Comparative Look at Liability
A comparative law analysis supports the above position that
sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG are tort provisions. In
England, the common law torts of deceit and negligence are
discussed with respect to damages related to the publication of
defective ad hoc communications."' In France, according to
numerous proceedings, the general tort clause of section 1382 of
the Civil Code was held applicable to violations of ad hoc
duties."' Similarly, in Italy and Switzerland, the general tort
107 See Resolution Recommendation and Report of the Financial Committee of June
15, 1994, BT-Drs. 12/7918, 102 [hereinafter Resolution Recommendation].
108 See Barnert, 47 WM 1473, 1483 (2002); Maier-Reimer & Webering, 47 WM
1857, 1863 (2002).
109 See KONDGEN, supra note 24, at 805 (concurring as to Swiss law and depicting
ad hoc publicity as a "capital market-related duty"). But see KALSS,
ANLEGERINTERESSEN 325 (2001); 48 OBA 641, 655 (2000) (dissenting as to Austrian
law).
l10 See ALCOCK, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000 212 (2000);
WILLIAM G. HORTON & GERHARD WEGEN, LITIGATION ISSUES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
SECURITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 288 (1997); THORNE & PRENTICE,
BUTTERWORTHS COMPANY LAW GUIDE 325 (4th ed. 2002); BLAIR, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE
TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES & MARKETS ACT OF 2000 149 (2001).
I11 See CA Paris 15 Jan. 1992, file no. Pal. 23 Apr. 1992, 293, note Marchi; Cass.
crim. 15 Mar. 1993, Bull. crim. n0 113, s. 280; Bull. Joly Bourse 1993, 365, note Jeantin;
CA Paris 18 Dec. 1995, Banque et droit n* 48, July-Aug. 1996, 35, chron. Peltier/de
Vauplane; CA Paris 30 Apr. 1997, Reof sc. crim. janvier-mars 1999, 129, note Riffault;
T. corr. Paris, 17 Dec. 1997, Bull. Joly Bourse 1998, 121, note Lesguillier; T. corr. Paris,
27 fdvrier 1998, RTD com. July-Sept. 1998, 640, note Rontchevsky; CA Paris, 8 Oct.
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provisions of Article 2043 of the codice civile 12 and Article 41 of
the OR,' 13 or liability for reliance,"14 respectively, are held
applicable. In Austria, tort claims are allowed for violations of a
protective law pursuant to section 1311 of the AGBG in
connection with section 82, paragraph 6 of the B5rseG."15 In
Greece, proceedings were based upon the protective law Article
34, paragraph 2 of the law 3632/1928 in connection with Article
914 of the AK (Civil Code)." 6  Finally, in the United States,
private rights of action are permitted under Rule 1Ob-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act so long as there is evidence of
misrepresentation and manipulation of share prices." 7
1999 RD bancaire et financier janvier-fdvrier 2000, 34. Cass. crim. 15 May 1997, D.
affaires 1997, 924. See also Fleischer/JRinig, 48 RIW 729 et seq. (2002).
112 See Sfameni, Commento all'art. 116, in: Marchetti & Bianchi (a cura diti), La
disciplina delle societti quotate nel testo unico dellafinanza, D.igs. Feb. 24, 1999, 509 n.
58. Art. 2043 cc, available at http://www.studiocelentano.it/codici/cc.
113 See HsU, AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT 271 (2000).
114 See FESTSCHRIFT CHAPIUS 143 (1998); K6ndgen, supra note 24, at 802. These
appropriately stress that the foundations of liability are only discussed and that there is a
factual lack of sanctions in Switzerland.
115 See HAUSMANINGER, INSIDER TRADING 408 (1997).
116 LG Athen 10370/1997, EEgntA 1998, S.296 = AEE 1998, S.284.
117 Rule lob-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility
of any natural securities exchanges,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
See HAZEN, supra note 47, at 569; STEINHAUER, INSIDERHANDELSVERBOT UND AD HOC
PUBLIZITAT 149 (1999); RIMBECK, RECHTSFOLGEN FEHLERHAFTER AD HOC-
MITTEILUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (2004). See infra notes
222 & 253 (noting jurisprudence).
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C. Problems of Terminology
1. Defective Ad hoc Communications
a) The Recently Introduced Sections 3 7b and 3 7c of
the WpHG
For the first time, by way of the fourth FFG of July 1, 2002,
the German legislature created special liability provisions for
omitted or defective ad hoc communications." 8 In contrast, as
shown above, there are no special provisions creating liability for
defective ad hoc communications in other developed countries.
Under German law, damages can be claimed under section 37c of
the WpHG for defective ad hoc communications and under section
37b for omitted ad hoc communications. As with stock exchange
prospectus liability (section 44 of the B6rsengesetz, Stock
Exchange Act), cases of false information are covered by section
37c of the WpHG." 9
In France, all adjudicated cases that granted damages to the
investors on the basis of incorrect ad hoc communications
involved felony misinformation to the public.20 Since both
elements existed at the same time, the element "unlawful act"
("faute") in Article 1382cc was also satisfied.'
2 1
b) General Tort Law
Sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG are directed only towards
the company, and not towards the individual directors on the
executive board. Therefore, in order to sue the individual
118 WpHG, §§ 37b-c.
119 In the past, ad hoc communication has often been abused by inserting
advertising statements and euphemistic communications. The inadmissibility of such
measures had already been determined by the Federal Supervisory Agency for Securities
Transactions (BAWe). According to the amended version of section 15, para. 1, sec. 2
of the WpHG by the 4th FFG, the codes used in an ad hoc communication are to be
conventional. Section 3 requires that other information which evidently does not fulfil
the requirements of section 1 must not be published nor be placed in connection with
information subject to publication. Section 15, para. 1, sec. 4 of the WpHG also demands
a correction of the defective ad hoc communication.
120 Art. L 465-1 al. 3 C. mon6t. fin.
121 See T. corr. Paris, 27 f6vrier 1998, RTD com. juillet-septembre 1998, 640, note
Rontchevsky.
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directors, one will have to continue to resort to other bases of
liability such as general tort law. 122 In recent years, German courts
have been looking to section 826 of the BGB to determine the
basis for liability. 23  Defective ad hoc communications best fit
into the classifications of deliberate incorrect information and
careless misinformation to third parties. 124
As the BGH recently stated, an omission only violates morality
if the demanded act constitutes a moral imperative, thereby
"requir[ing] special circumstances that render the damaging action
immoral according to general business conduct due to its purpose,
the used means or with regard to the shown intentions."'125  Thus,
the disclosure requirements are stricter under section 37b of the
WpHG than under the BGH. For example, it would constitute
immoral conduct if a company's board knew a relevant negative
fact but failed to publish it in order to avoid any negative impact
on the company's share price. 126 Reciprocally, this also applies to
cases in which a board does not publish a fact having potential
positive influence on the share price, in order to sell their own
shares cheaply. In these cases, insider information is used for the
personal benefit of the board of directors 127 at the expense of, and
122 Prior to the introduction of the provision July 1, 2002, the injured could only
invoke the general tort provisions. See Graf Lambsdorff, 18 Vur 207 (2003) n. 3000-
3500 (noting the injured parties whose cases will still be decided on the basis of the
former law).
123 See supra notes 2 & 6.
124 See M611ers & Leisch, 46 WM 1648 (2001); Krause, 31 ZGR 799, 820 (2002);
concurring Rssner & Bolkert, 23 ZIP 1471, 1476 (2002), Abram, 14 ZBB 41, 48
(2003). In the Infomatec case, the OLG Munich expressly confirmed several actual and
legal requirements and thereby widely concurred with the LG Augsburg. See OLG
Munich of Oct. 1, 2002, 23 ZIP 1989 (2002) at 1.1 .b) -Infomatec II.
125 BGH of July 10, 2001, 54 NJW 3702 (2001) (citing immoral damages and
omission).
126 See Handelsblatt of April 17, 2001 and SunburstKlage@Yahoo.de (showing the
accusation against the persons in charge of Sunburst Merchandising AG). See
Memorandum from the Public Prosecutor (Mar. 1, 2001), file no. 940 Js 9788/01
(showing the accusation against the persons in charge of Met@box AG). Due to
inadmissible insider dealings, Augsburg public prosecutors brought an action against the
board of CPU Softwarehouse AG.
127 This also applies to stock option schemes for the benefit of the boards, which are
linked to a particular boost of the share price. See, for example, the stock option scheme
mentioned in OLG Stuttgart of June 13, 2001, 47 WM 1060 (2002). See BGH of July
19, 2004, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004); BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 218/03, 25
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
by deceiving, the investors.128 Additionally, it is considered
unethical for a person to intentionally influence investors in an
unfair manner by publishing grossly incorrect ad hoc
communications. 1
29
Legal scholars have argued that ignorance of the duty to
disclose is both unethical and a basis for negligence, even though
there is no knowledge of the facts. 30 Yet the BGH's comments'
point to the conclusion that it deems knowledge of the general
duty of publication, with respect to the relevant facts, necessary.3
Furthermore, it has to be obvious that the facts need to be
published. This is the case if the business is particularly risky.'33
It is still not clear under what conditions violations of duties
under the securities law constitute a violation of the protective law
in terms of section 823, paragraph 2 of BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch,
(BGB or German Civil Code). A provision classified as a
protective law must not only aim at protecting the general public,
but also at protecting individual parties. According to the
jurisprudence, it is sufficient if the legislature strove to protect
individuals, even if protecting the general interest was clearly the
primary goal.'34  Securities law primarily aims at providing
information for transactions by mandating market transparency
and equal treatment of investors as well as the overall protection
ZIP 1599 (2004); BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP 1604 (2004); M61lers &
Leisch, supra note 124, at 1652; Fuchs & Diihn, 2 BKR 799, 821 (2002).
128 See Krause, 31 ZGR 799, 824 (2002).
129 See BGH of July 19, 2004, 1I ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004); BGH of July 19,
2004, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004); BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP
1604 (2004); M61lers & Leisch, supra note 124; Fuchs & DiIhn, supra note 127.
130 See SOERGEL, BGB § 826 n. 62 (12th ed. 1998); MONCHKoMM, BGB § 826 n. 49
(3d ed. 1997) (citing action toward a contracting party). Even further, according to
Mertens, simple negligence is to suffice in cases of a legal error about a legal duty of
disclosure.
131 See BGH of July 7, 2001, 54 NJW 3702, 3702 (2001).
132 Cf LG Hanau of Mar. 14, 1996, 41 WM 540, 1544 (1996). In the facts on which
the reasoning is based, the bank refrained from informing a non-customer about
suspicious facts regarding the business partner. The latter kept an account with the bank,
through which the fraudulent businesses were executed.
133 See FS Ulmer, 817, 820 (2003). Due to the business risk, the Bundesgerichtshof
has developed high standards for duties of information with commodity future options
and future options in general.
134 See BGH, 40 BGHZ 306.
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of market integrity."' Because freedom of decision and the estate
of the investors are the main focus, the question as to whether
securities law provisions are apt to be protective laws depends
upon whether or not they are aimed at individual protections.
Then the question is whether the respective provision can be
considered a supplementation and aggregation of section 826 of
the BGB, and if a damage claim fits into the general liability
scheme. Section 15 of the WpHG, sections 263 and 264a of the
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB or Penal Code), section 331 of the
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB or Commercial Code), section 400 of
the Aktiengesetz (AktG or Stock Companies Act), former section
88 of the B6rsG, as well as section 20a of the WpHG, in
connection with sections 38 paragraph 1, number 4 and 39
paragraph 1, numbers 1 and 2 of the WpHG are being discussed as
protective laws. Of these, the most relevant to the discussion of ad
hoc publicity is the former section 88 of the B6rsG and its
successor provision, section 20a of the WpHG.
In perspective, in both the United States 136 and Austria, the
protective law character of their comparable statutory provisions
has been expressly affirmed.'37 The BGH has confirmed section
264a of the StGB and section 400 of the AktG as being protective
laws, but has yet to classify section 88 of the B6rsG as a protective
law. 138
2. Damages
a) Liability for Registration Statements
As for liability for false or misleading registration statements,
the German legislature clearly stated that the issuer has to take
back the shares and reimburse the investor the initial price.'39
135 Cf. FLEISCHER, GUTACHTEN F ZUM 64. DJT 25 (2002).
136 An infringement can result in a claim for damages if the violated legal right at
least partly serves individual protection and if the injured party belongs to the protected
group. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
137 See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 115.
138 BGH of July 19,2004, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004) = 49 WM 1721 (2004);
BGH of July 19, 2004, 11 ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004) = 57 NJW 2664 (2004); BGH
of July 19,2004, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP 1604 (2004) = 49 WM 1726 (2004) = 57 NJW
2668 (2004). Cf Leisch, in ADHOC-PUBLIZITAT, supra note 2, § 16 n.15.
139 B6rsG, § 44, para. 1, s. 1.
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b) Violations ofAd hoc Publicity
A similar rule, however, cannot be found in the newly-
introduced sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG. The answer to the
inextricably linked questions, which damages must be
compensated and which standard is to be applied in the causation
analysis, depends on which interests sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG intend to protect.140 Both the negative (rescission) and so-
called alternative interests (out-of-pocket) have to be considered.
In the cases regulated by statutes, the negative interest refers to the
situation one would be in if the claimant had not relied on the
validity of the contract or the authorization to represent the
contractual partner. 4' In this case, the contract would not have
been closed and the performance of the contractual duties would
not have taken place. As a consequence, the injured party would
then have the right to demand that the contract be rescinded.
In Germany, this form of damages is called "natural
restitution," according to section 249, paragraph 1 of the BGB,
and its applicability does not depend on a suffered pecuniary
loss. 142 The possibility of natural restitution is unclear in the area
of liability for incorrect securities information disclosure. Since
the tortfeasor is not a contractual partner, it is argued by some that
natural restitution is not possible. Otherwise, the tortfeasor would
be forced to take over an investment which they never
possessed. 4 This argument is based on the narrow conception of
restitution in section 249, paragraph 1 of the BGB. First, the
purpose of tort law is to put the injured party in the position that he
would have occupied if the tortfeasor had not violated his duties.
It cannot be argued that the tortfeasor must also be put in the
situation that he would have been in had he not violated his duties.
140 For the following in detail, see Mo1lers & Leisch, supra note 2, § 14 n. 77.
141 BGB §§ 122 & 179.
142 Mollers & Leisch, supra note 124, at 1655. See also FLEISCHER,
INFORMATIONSASYMMETRIE IM VERTRAGSRECHT: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UND
INTERDISZIPLINARE ABHANDLUNG ZU REICHWEITE UND GRENZEN
VERTRAGSSCHLUSSBEZOGENER AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHTEN 440 (2001); 200 AcP 91 (2000);
Roland Schwarze, VORVERTRAGLICHE VERSTANDIGUNGSPFLICHTEN 86 (2001); STEPHAN
LORENZ & THOMAS RIEHM, LEHRBUCH ZUM NEUEN SCHULDRECHT 372 (2002); ANwKoM-
BGB/KREBS, § 311 n. 27 (2002); Fleischer, 56 BB 1869, 1870 (2002); Cf STEFAN
GEIBEL, DER KAPITALANLEGERSCHADEN 90 (2002).
143 Geibel, supra note 142, at 110; Fuchs & Diuhn, supra note 5, at 1068.
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This is not the purpose of section 249, paragraph 1 of the BGB.
It is also argued that the decision for making an investment
stems from the investor, and he must consequently bear the risk of
not being able to make use of this investment. This is not very
convincing, however, because the claim for the negative interest is
based on the assumption that the injured party would not have
invested had the information been correct. The risk of not being
able to make use of the investment is the result of the violation of
the duties of disclosure and must be bome by the tortfeasor.144 It is
therefore correct to adhere to the long-held jurisprudence of the
BGH to allow natural restitution in these cases. 45 Regarding
section 826 of the BGB, the BGH has recently subscribed to the
legal scholars' view146 that, with regard to incorrect ad hoc
communications, the negative interest can be claimed.'47
The negative interest cannot be claimed if the plaintiff fails to
establish causation between his purchase decision and the
incorrect ad hoc communication. This typically requires some
temporal relationship, such as a purchase occurring within nine
months after the dissemination of the incorrect ad hoc
communication. 141 Yet the BGH does not need to address a
possible out-of-pocket loss if the plaintiff does not bring anything
forward with respect to causation.
In cases where the reversal of the transaction is inappropriate,
the courts grant monetary compensation. The amount of damages
depends on how much the buyer, relying on the incorrect
information, paid over the actual value of the stock.14 9 The same is
true if the buyer is able to prove that, with the correct information,
he would have entered into the contract under different
144 Franz Clemens Leisch, 58 JZ 945, 946 (2003).
145 Cf BGH of June 27, 1984, 37 NJW 2524 (1984); BGH of June 17, 1991, 36
WM 1543, 1545 (1991); BGH of Dec. 12, 1991, 45 NJW 1223 (1992); BGH of July 5,
1993, 46 NJW 2865 (1993); Cf M61lers & Leisch, supra note 2, § 14 n.112. See Veil,
32 ZGR 365 (2003).
146 M61lers & Leisch, supra note 124, at 1655.
147 BGH of July 19,2004, II ZR 402/02, ZIP 2004, 1593 = WM 2004, 1721; BGH of
July 19,.2004, It ZR 218/03, ZIP 2004, 1599 = NJW 2004, 2664; BGH of July 19, 2004,
II ZR 217/02, ZIP 2004, 1604.
148 BGH of July 19, 2004, II ZR 218/03, ZIP 2004, 1599 = NJW 2004, 2664.
149 Cf BGH of May 25, 1977, 22 WM 999, 1001 (1977).
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conditions.15 ° But this is no longer the negative interest, because
the buyer is not in a situation where he would have avoided
entering into a contract. Rather, the injured party is put into the
position he would have been in had he entered into a different
contract. The paradigm for this is the abatement of the purchase
price according to section 441 of the BGB in the case of defects in
purchased goods. Since this form of damages protects the interest
in a contract that has not actually been entered into, it could be
called alternative interest.'51 For sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG, the alternative interest consists of either the amount the
investor overpaid for the security, or the amount he has sold it for
at less than fair value as a result of the faulty information. The
important peculiarity for the causal link is the fact that the price is
not negotiated but rather a result of the mechanism of the capital
markets.
Which damages have to be compensated is a topic of heated
debate in the literature. At the moment, three distinct views can be
discerned. One view holds that sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG grant the investor the right to be put in the position he
would have occupied had he not entered into the securities
transaction (negative interest - damages resulting from entering
into the contract).'52 A second view contends that sections 37b
and 37c of the WpHG rule out the negative interest, so that only
the alternative interest can be claimed.13 Finally, some argue that
sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG institute a priority of the
alternative interest.
15 4
150 Cf BGH of June 24, 1998, 51 NJW 2900 (1998); S. Lorenz, 52 NJW 1001
(1999).
151 Cf GEIBEL, supra note 142, at 28, 129, 203 (describing this interest as "the
positive interest in a hypothetically more advantageous contract").
152 Alternatively, the investor is able to demand the amount that he has paid too
much for the security (i.e., alternative interest - damage resulting from paying an
incorrect price), cf R issner & Bolkart, supra note 124, at 1475.
153 Maier-Reimer & Webering, supra note 108, at 1860. For a more cautious
account, see Hutter & Leppert, supra note 63, at 655.
154 In exceptional cases, restitution can still be granted. See Fuchs & Dtihn, supra
note 5, at 1068; Baums, 167 ZHR 139, 185 (2003). A final opinion seeks to deny natural
restitution, but it defines the damage resulting from an incorrect price in a way that is
neither the alternative nor the negative interest. See S. Reichert & Weller, 34 ZRP 49, 55
(2002). For a more cautious account, see Grobmann & Nikoleyczik, 54 DB 2031, 2035
(2002) and GEHRT, DIE NEUE AD HOC-PUBLIZITAT NACH § 15 WPHG 205 (1997).
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An analysis of the wording and the legal history of sections
37b and 37c of the WpHG, as well as the systematic arguments
seconded by the protective aim of section 15 WpHG, indicate a
straightforward solution. The investor's rational decision and his
assets are protected. Therefore, sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG principally grant the negative interest, so that the damages
resulting from entering into the contract have to be
compensated. 55 Nevertheless, these provisions are also subject to
a claim for damages resulting from an incorrect price, the
alternative interest. The calculation of the alternative interest is a
highly contentious issue. One view seeks to compare the market
price of the share on the day when the ad hoc statement should
have been publicized with the market price on the day when the
facts actually became known.'56 Another view holds that the
actual price paid has to be compared with the real price of the
security on the very same day. 57  The second method of
calculating the damages is the only one contemplated by section
249, paragraph 1 of the BGB. The problem then arises as to which
point in time is relevant - the time when the damage was caused
or the time when the damage is being compensated?
In general, the claimant may choose between the damage
resulting from entering into the contract and the damage resulting
from an incorrect price. This choice between remedies is in line
with other jurisdictions. For example, the United States allows for
these two methods of calculating the damages (rescission15 s and
the out-of-pocket loss).'59 Out-of-pocket loss is defined as the
difference between the actual price and the hypothetical price had
155 For detailed discussion, see Thomas M611ers & Franz Leisch, 2 BKR 1071
(2002).
156 Reichert & Weller, supra note 154.
157 Fleischer, 56 BB 1869, 1872 (2002); Maier-Reimer & Webering, supra note
108, at 1861.
158 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d
Cir. 1979); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4b' Cir. 1969).
159 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 791 (2001); Glick, 613 F.2d at
31; Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F. Supp. 834, 836 (W.D. Ark. 1996); Western Federal
Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982). For a comprehensive analyses of U.S.
case law on the topic, see RIMBECK, RECHTSFOLGEN FEHLERHAFTER AD HOC-
MI-rEILUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (2004); see also supra
note 117 and the sources cited therein.
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the incorrect ad hoc communication not been made. 60
The French Cour de Cassation, in its jurisdiction, favors the
damage resulting from an incorrect price.' To address the
problem of market risks,'62 there are several instruments that allow
for consideration of an individual case and its facts. The wording
of sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG already includes the
necessary requirements to counteract this risk effectively. Apart
from the restriction on those who are able to sue, the test of
causation is of particular importance, depending on which
damages are claimed.
In cases of incorrect information regarding securities, a claim
based on section 826 of the BGB requires the claimant to have
suffered pecuniary lOSS, 163 but the claim nevertheless covers the
negative interest. Again, the claimant may choose between the
negative and the alternative interest.
160 As for the approach in American law, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); In re Executive Telecard Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp.
1021, 1025 (2d Cir. 1997); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993); Fry v. UAL
Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626 (7th Cir. 1991); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d. 1405 (1st
Cir. 1990); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976);
Harris v. American Inv. Co, 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9 th Cir. 1975); Ronald B. Lee, The Measure of Damages Under Section 10(b) and
Rule JOb-5 46 MD. L. REV. 1266 (1987); Robert B. Thompson, "Simplicity and
Certainty" in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule JOb-5, 51 Bus. LAW. 1177 (1996);
See HAZEN, supra note 47, at 420.
161 In a judgment of April 30, 1997, it granted damages to investors that had bought
their shares prior to the publication of the incorrect statements and had decided to keep
these shares because of these incorrect statements. The Cour d'appel measured the
damages as the difference between the price of the shares at the time of the first incorrect
statement on June 29, 1989 and the price of the shares when the insolvency proceedings
were started on June 25, 1990. CA Paris 30 Avril 1997, Rev. sc. crim. janvier-mars
1999, 129, comment by Riffault. These rulings yielded assent in the literature, have
become the dominant opinion, and have been upheld by the Tribunal correctionnel de
Paris, T. corr. Paris, 17 d~cembre 1997, Bull. Joly Bourse 1998, 121, comment by
Lesguillier; T. corr. Paris, 27 fivrier 1998, RTD com. juillet-septembre 1998, 640,
comment by Rontchevsky.
162 Cf Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1871. It remains to be seen whether new norms
will be abused as way to get rid of an annoying contract. But the courts' decisions on the
old law make this highly improbable.
163 M6llers & Leisch, Ad hoc-Publizitdt, supra note 2, at 36.
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3. Causation
a) Liability for Registration Statements and Take-
over Bids
The burden of proof has been shifted to favor the claimant in
cases of liability for registration statements pursuant to section 45,
paragraph 2, number 1 of the BbrsG. 64 For a possible liability
claim, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the incorrect
information caused him to purchase the securities; rather causation
is presumed.'65 The burden of proof is also shifted for incorrect
statements in take-over bids according to section 12, paragraph 3,
number 1 of the WpJG. As for liability claims, the claimant does
not have to prove that he actually relied on the incorrect
statements when he accepted the bid.'66
b) Liabilityfor Ad hoc Statements
In general tort law and under sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG, the legislature did not introduce a shift of the burden of
proof in favor of the claimant. Whether the purchaser made his
decision as a result of an incorrect fact or the omission of a fact is
a question of causation and must principally be stated and proven
by the claimant.'67 The subjective nature of this required element
of the claim can be difficult to prove.'68 For a claim based on
164 3d FFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drucks. 13/8933, 76 = BR-Drucks.
605/97, 76.
165 Prior to the shifting of the burden of proof in the course of the 3d FFG, the courts
had already reached a similar result by using the institute of the "Anlagestimmung": The
published prospectus creates a certain "Anlagestimmung" (a general attitude towards a
certain security) that allows an assumption that the incorrect prospectus was the reason
for the investor to buy the shares. S. RG of Oct. 11, 1912, 80 RGZ 196, 204; BGH of
July 12, 1982, 27 WM 867 (1982); BGH of July 14, 1998,19 ZIP 1528, 1531 (1998), cf.
EWiR 835 (1998) (Koller); OLG Duisseldorf of April 5, 1984, 29 WM 586, 596 (1984);
OLG Frankfurt of March 27, 1996, 17 ZIP1037, 1038 (1996); BGH of July 14, 1998,
139 BGHZ 225, 233; ASSMANN & SCHUTZE, supra note 105, § 7, n.213; Hamann, in
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, BORSENGESETZ, VERKAUFSPROSPEKTGESETz ex-§§ 45, 46
B6rsG n.65 (Frank Schafer et al. ed., 1999).
166 For more detail, see M6llers, KK-WpOG, § 12 n. 109 (2003).
167 Cf. BGH, 36 WM 1543, 1545 (1991); BGH, 13 ZIP 1561, 1562 (1992); BGH, 14
ZIP 1467, 1470 (1993).
168 In the Infomatec case, the claimant was able to convince the court that he had
bought the shares because of the incorrect information, thus the causation for the
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section 826 of the BGB, the literature has proposed resorting to the
institution of "Anlagestimmung" (a general attitude towards a
security created by a publication). 169  Section 45, paragraph 2,
number 4 of the B6rsG supports the conclusion that the legislature
consider both ad hoc statements and registration statements, and
the company's report as equal in their influence on the investor.
Those responsible for registration statements escape liability if the
incorrect information is corrected in an ad hoc statement
according to section 15 of the WpHG. The possibility of adjusting
errors in the registration statements with an ad hoc statement
would be inexplicable if the legislature had assumed that an ad
hoc statement was not apt to influence the general attitude towards
a security. 7 ' The investor does not have to know the precise
nature of the incorrect information. The reasoning that the
incorrect information changes the price of a security and causes
the investor to buy or sell his securities is sufficient.'71
In other legal systems, courts have dispensed with the direct
causation requirement. The French courts have lowered the
requirements for the test of causation and they have awarded
damages to investors after they bought shares because of incorrect
ad hoc statements.'72 In the United States the fraud-on-the-market
theory is applied. This theory lays down the rebuttable
presumption that, in an open and developed capital market, the
price of a security is determined by the essential available
information concerning the company and the development of the
business. Incorrect publications, therefore, deceive the investor
transaction was proved. Cf. LG Augsburg, 46 WM 1944 (2001); OLG M'Jnchen, 23 ZIP
1989 (2002).
169 See Mollers & Leisch, supra note 124; see also Rdssner & Bolkart, 23 ZIP 1471,
1476 (2002); Abram, 14 ZBB 41, 50 (2003); FLEISCHER, supra note 135, at 102;
Fleischer & Kalss, 46 AG 329, 333 (2002); LG Frankfurt on the Main, No. 3-7 0 43/02
(Apr. 28, 2003); LG Frankfurt on the Main No. 3-7 0 47/02 (Apr. 28, 2003). But see
OLG Miinchen, 23 ZIP 1727, 1728 (2002), (reasoning that not every ad hoc statement is
able to create a "Anlagestimmung"); Rieckers, 56 BB 1213, 1219 (2002).
170 See Mrllers & Leisch, supra note 124, at 1658 (2001); Rbssner & Bolkart, 23
ZIP 1471, 1476 (2002).
171 Baums, 167 ZHR 139, 181 (2003), (giving further references to information
efficiency of capital markets); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 364 (7th ed. 2003).
172 T. corr. Paris, 27 fdvrier 1998, RTD com. juillet-septembre 1998, 640, note
Rontchevsky.
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even if they did not actually rely on the incorrect information. The
causation requirement for the investor's decision is the same as in
cases where the investor actually relied on the incorrect
publication.173
An attempt was made recently to transfer the concept of
"Anlagestimmung" (changes in market mood resulting from the
release of new information) to the newly-introduced sections 37b
and 37c of the WpHG and enhance it to shift the burden of
proof.174 This would mean that the claimant buying the securities,
within a certain period after the wrongful publication, would not
have to prove that they had purchased the securities because of the
incorrect information. 175  But this framework was rendered
unworkable for several reasons.
First, one has to recognize that the concept of
"Anlagestimmung" cannot be transferred to section 37b of the
WpHG, since the omission of obligatory information is not apt to
influence the general attitude. 176  Second, it cannot be applied to
173 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-245 (1988) states:
The modem securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing
hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early
fraud cases and our understanding of Rule lOb-5's reliance requirement must
encompass these differences ... The courts below accepted a presumption,
created by the fraud-on-the-market theory and subject to rebuttal by petitioners,
that persons who had traded Basic shares had done so in reliance on the
integrity of the price set by the market, but because of petitioners' material
misrepresentation that price had been fraudulently depressed. Requiring a
plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if
omitted material information had been disclosed or if misrepresentation had not
been made would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the
Rule lOb-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market. Arising out of
considerations of fairness, public policy and probability, as well as judicial
economy, presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of
proof between parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
174 Rbssner & Bolkart, 23 ZIP 1471, 1476 (2002).
175 Cf. M6llers & Leisch, supra note 2.
176 This should not be confused with the cases dealt with in § 44 of the B6rsG where
registration statements omit material facts. Those responsible for the registration
statements create an incorrect overall impression of their company when they omit
certain facts. The issuer who keeps silent violating section 15 of the WpHG does not
create any impression though he would have to do so. For the difference between the
deception by doing something and the deception by omitting to do something, see
FLEISCHER, INFORMATIONSASYMMETRIE IM VERTRAGSRECHT 245 (2001).
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section 37c, paragraph 1, number 2 of the WpHG since this
provision sanctions the publication of incorrect negative facts.
Only section 37c, paragraph 1, number 1 of the WpHG remains.
This provision is most closely related to section 44 of the BdrsG as
it also sanctions deception by publication of incorrect positive
facts. The fact that the legislature used section 44 of the BorsG as
a blueprint' 77 when creating sections 37b and 37c of the WpHG
works against a shifting of the burden of proof.178 If the legislature
wished to introduce a shifting of the burden of proof for cases
falling within the scope of section 37c, paragraph 1, number 1 of
the WpHG, it could have included this in the wording (as in
section 45, paragraph 2, number 1 of the BirsG). Yet this was not
the case. One can, of course, still revert to the concept of
"Anlagestimmung," which does not lead to a shifting of the
burden of proof, but rather a relaxation of the burden. First, the
issuer is allowed to prove that his publication did not influence the
general attitude towards his securities. Secondly, the issuer is not
forced to fully prove a different causality but is only obliged to
state and prove that another reasonable chain of causality is
conceivable.179 Neither the wording nor the official legislative
documents indicate that the legislature wanted to rule out this
cautious modification of the burden of proof.'80
The opponents to transferring the concept of the
"Anlagestimmung," argue that ad hoc statements, unlike
registration statements, are not meant to boost the sale of shares. 8'
Experiences in recent years, most notably the legislature's
strengthening of liability under section 15, paragraph 1, subsection
2 of the WpHG, contradict these arguments.182
177 4th FFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drs. 14/8017 94 to WpHG sec.
37b.
178 See Rbssner & Bolkart, 23 ZIP 1471, 1476 (2002).
179 BGH, 43 WM 1528, 1531 (1998) - Elsflether Werft; OLG Disseldorf, 29 WM
586, 596 (1984) - Beton- und Monierbau; OLG Frankfurt, 39 WM 291, 298 (1994) -
Bond; Schwark, BrrsG, §§ 45, 46 n.34 (2d ed. 1994); Hauptmann, Vortmann,
Prospekthaftung und Anlageberatung, § 3 n. 122 (2000).
180 FLEISCHER, supra note 135, at 102 (allowing restitution in very few cases); cf 56
BB 1869, 1873 (2002).
181 Veil, 32 ZGR 365, 383 (2003).
182 For the abuse of ad hoc statements as a marketing instrument, see Braun, in
MOLLERS & ROTTER, supra note 2, § 8 n. 117 (2003).
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Of course, the function of the concept of "Anlagestimmung"
must be observed. It attempts to prevent giving an unjustified
advantage to the wrongdoer, and does not attempt to shift the
investor's performance risk to the issuer. If the claimant's burden
of proof is reduced, the issuer must be granted the right to reduce
the damages by stating that another chain of causation has led to
the loss.'83
Cases in which the investor would not have sold securities had
the information been correct must be treated differently,
however. 84 It is futile for the investor to prove that without the
wrongdoing he would have held the securities until the last day of
the trial; thus, this presumption does not exist. While the rational
investor is normally influenced by the information concerning the
company when deciding which security to buy, the motives for
selling a security can vary.'85 The official legislative documents
for section 37c, paragraph 1, number 2 of the WpHG state: "It is
crucial in the case where the securities were sold 'too cheaply' and
that this has led to a loss." '186 This clearly shows that, with respect
to the selling of securities, the authors of the act have only thought
of reimbursing the damages resulting from an incorrect price.
18 7
Additional damages are not addressed directly.
Causation is easily proven if the investor only wants to claim
the damages resulting from an incorrect price. To prove causation,
one must simply establish that "but for" the incorrect information,
the price for the security would have been higher. Since the
investor only claims that he would have bought the security at'a
lower price or would have sold the security for a higher price, his
knowledge of the incorrect information is immaterial. The
knowledge of these facts is already included in the price of the
183 Cf. Fleischer & Kalss, 46 AG 329, 333 (2002). The idea that the burden of proof
can be eased in these cases has to be examined more thoroughly.
184 Mrllers & Leisch, supra note 2, § 14, n. 114 (2003).
185 The decision may depend on the realization of a previously set gain or on
reaching a predetermined maximum loss. Very often the decision to sell can simply be
motivated by the fact that the investor needs his funds elsewhere.
186 4thFFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drs. 14/8017, 94.
187 For practical purposes, it is not important whether one restricts damages to
overpayment, or whether one excludes the negative interest when one tries to verify the
causation.
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security.' Therefore, in cases in which a security was purchased,
the investor has to establish that the price paid would have been
different if the information had been published.'89 The question of
how low the price would have been maintained on the market is no
longer a question of causation and is, therefore, not governed by
section 286 of the Zivilproze3ordnung (ZPO or Civil Procedure
Code), but by section 287 of the ZPO. 9°
In most recent decisions concerning section 826 of the BGB,
the BGH rejected a general shifting of the burden of proof
pursuant to section 45, paragraph 2, number 1 of the BirsG as well
as general facilitations on the basis of prima facie evidence. Yet
in particular cases, the development of proper "Anlagestimmung"
was held possible.'9'
In case decided by the BGH, the plaintiff was able to establish
that the incorrect ad hoc communication was critical in his
decision to buy the shares. 192 In another case, because the stock
purchase took place more than nine months after the ad hoc




a) Degree of Fault: Intent and Gross Negligence as
the Degree of Fault for Liability for Incorrect
Information on Capital Markets
In regulating the violation of capital market rules, the
legislature introduced guidance on the required degree of fault.
Notably, if incorrect registration statements are filed, liability is
188 Cf Maier-Reimer & Webering, supra note 108, at 1860.
189 Maier-Reimer & Webering, supra note 108; WpHG, § 37b, para. 1, no. 1.
190 Cf M6llers & Leisch, supra note 124, at 1656, 1660; Fleischer, supra note 157,
at 1874.
191 BGH, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004); BGH, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599
(2004); BGH, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP 1604 (2004). See R6ssner & Bolkart, 23 ZIP 1471,
1476 (2002); M11ers & Leisch, supra note 2, § 15, n.65.
192 BGH, 11 ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004).
193 BGH, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004), remanded to BGH, II ZR 217/02, ZIP
2004, 1604.
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restricted to intent and gross negligence.1 94 The degrees of fault
also apply to incorrect take-over bids according to section 12,
paragraph 2 of the WpOG and liability claims based on incorrect
ad hoc statements according to sections 37b and 37c of the
WpHG.
Originally, the injured party had to prove the fault of those
responsible for producing the registration statements. Most
scholars deem this proof practically impossible to obtain and have
therefore opted for an analogy to old sections 282 and 285 of the
BGB. 9 5 The legislature shared their view in the third FFG. As
the facts lie exclusively within the defendant's knowledge, it
would be impossible for the claimant to prove fault in practice. 196
Therefore, the burden of proof was shifted in favor of the
claimant, creating the presumption of fault. In the special laws
dealing with incorrect capital market information, a common
standard for fault and the burden of proof is implemented.
Although this degree of fault applies to many of the liability
provisions in securities law, it is not undisputed. Some favor a
restriction to intentional transgressions, since otherwise the risk of
personal liability would result in artistic formulations which
diametrically oppose quick and accurate ad hoc statements.
Furthermore, engaging in the exchange of shares is an inherently
risky business.' 97 On the other hand, one could include all forms
of negligence,198 because they are included in the general civil law
liability for misstatements.1 99
Taking everything into consideration, many arguments support
maintaining the current middle-of-the-road position, imposing
liability only for intentional misrepresentation and gross
194 B6rsG, § 45, para. 1, 55 B6rsG & § 13 Verkaufsprospektgesetz, VerkProsG
(Law on the Prospectus for Securities Offered for Sale).
195 See CANARIS, BANKVERTRAGSRECHT n.2281 (2d ed. 1981); Assmann, 28 WM
138, 141 (1983); HAMANN, in SCHAFER (ed)., WpHG, B6rsG, VerkProspG, §§ 45, 46
B6rsG (1999).
196 3rd FFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drs. 13/8933, to § 46 BbrsG; see
also 4 h FFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drs. 14/8017, 93 to § 37b WpHG.
197 Thiummel, 53 DB 2331, 2333 (2001); LG Mitnchen I, 46 WM 1948 (2001).
198 See KOngden, supra note 24, at 791, 807.
199 For an example of an argument against including gross negligence for
specialized liability claims in general, see GRUNDMANN, BANKRECHTSHANDBUCH § 112
n.56 (2d ed. 2001).
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negligence. On the one hand, a restriction to intentional
misrepresentation is not convincing. In the past, ad hoc statements
have been recklessly formulated and abused as another form of
advertising. Objectively, ad hoc statements are very often the sole
basis for an investor's decision. That is reason enough for
ensuring that the investor specifically, and the capital market in
general, can rely on the correctness of this information."0
Imposing liability for gross negligence is also not unreasonable for
those who have to obey the duties of disclosure, since gross
negligence represents a much higher standard than regular
negligence under section 276, paragraph 1 of the BGB.2 °1 The
director or executive is able to avoid committing gross negligence
by procuring professional assistance 0 2 or by insuring himself
against the risk.20 3 If the imposition of sanctions is not to be
rendered an empty threat, gross negligence must result in liability.
Great Britain 2" and the United States2 5 both recognize liability in
cases of gross negligence and recklessness.
On the other hand, liability for all forms of negligence goes too
far. Krndgen most recently argued for extending liability to all
forms of negligence.20 6 Restricting liability to gross negligence
can only be justified, economically and legally, if the norms of
conduct are imprecise, making it difficult to realize one's duties or
to properly evaluate one's conduct. This is principally true for ad
hoc statements, however, the legislature has already accounted for
these problems in the wording of the norm.20 7 In addition,
supervising authorities are more precisely establishing the duty to
publish ad hoc statements, making a further restriction to gross
negligence unnecessary. Moreover, the gap between negligence
200 2d FFG, supra note 15, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Dr. 12/6679, at 33.
201 BGHZ, NJW, 47 (1994), 2093-2094.
202 See Thomas M.J. M6llers, FRANKFURTER ALLEGMAINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 29, 2001,
at 23.
203 KONDGEN, THEORIE DER PROSPEKTHAFTUNG 54 (1984); Reichert & Weller, supra
note 154, at 56.
204 See § 397 FSAMA 2000; Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889) (dealing
with the "tort of deceit").
205 Cf. infra note 222.
206 Kbngden, supra note 24, at 791, 807.
207 Ad hoc publicity requires a significant relevance for the price of the shares.
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and gross negligence is too wide. Finally, it is difficult to explain
why the German legislature initially requires gross negligence, just
to shift the burden of proof to the disadvantage of the Director or
Executive.
Kdndgen is correct when he states that this back and forth
between gross negligence and shifting burden of proof is
surprising. Restricting fault to gross negligence may be justified
under the theory that capital market liability awards damages for
disappointed general confidence, 2 ' although, according to general
civil law principles, personal contact alone creates information and
counselling duties. Dispensing with the requirement of reliance on
personal contact is balanced by the restriction to intentional
misrepresentation and gross negligence. In that way, those having
to publish ad hoc statements are not overly privileged in relation
to the general prerequisites for liability in German law which
require intentional behavior in order to recover for pecuniary
losses. 20 9 Liability for gross negligence complies with the results
of the courts in their rulings regarding section 826 of the BGB.21 °
The wide gap between negligence and gross negligence,
mentioned by Kdndgen, is reduced when gross negligence is
assumed.
b) Intention to Harm in section 826 of the BGB
Liability for negligent behavior is an exception to the German
tort law principle that liability for harming other people's assets
outside a contract requires intent.211
The requirement of intent to harm another person in section
826 of the BGB requires that the tortfeasor be aware of the harm
done and that he desires, or at least assents, to the harm.
Therefore, conditional intent is sufficient.212 The intent of the
tortfeasor must be responsible for all resulting damages. It is
208 Cf MOLLERS & ROTTER, supra note 2, § 16 n.7; see also supra Part III.A.2.
209 Normally, penal laws regulating crimes against other people's assets regularly
demand more than normal negligence.
210 See infra Part II1.C.
211 Oechsler, in Staudinger, § 826, Nr. 12 et seq. BGB (13th ed. 1998).
212 The tortfeasor acts with conditional intent if he is seriously aware of the fact that
his acts might violate a duty and he accepts this. BGHZ of June 14, 2000, 53 NJW 2896,
2897 (2000); Thomas, in Palandt, BGB, § 826 n.9 (62d ed. 2003).
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enough if the intent roughly covers the way and the direction of
the consequences. A precise knowledge of the extent of the harm,
the causation, and the persons damaged is not necessary."'
Awareness of the immorality is not part of the elements of the
norm, otherwise especially ruthless and reckless behavior would
be rewarded. Subjectively, it is only necessary that the tortfeasor
be aware of the facts that render the act immoral.21 4
According to German courts, ruthless behavior creates a
presumption of intent to harm another person. This presumption is
clear when the tortfeasor intentionally turns a blind eye to facts
that constitute immorality.2 5  Some, however, argue that to
assume intent is absurd, as the company is only interested in
higher prices for its shares and not in harming investors.216 An
assumption of intent would also contradict the principle in German
tort law that the harming of one's own assets is compensated only
in exceptional cases. 2 7  Arguably, those spreading incorrect
financial data about their company are interested in high prices for
their securities. Critics of presumed intent ignore the fact that
dissemination of false information is simply harming the investor.
This understanding was recognized by the legislature of the fourth
FFG in the new section 37c of the WpHG stating that the investor
buys his share "at too high a price in cases of incorrect positive ad
213 BGH of Mar. 8, 1951, 4 NJW 596, 597 (1951), with comments Coing; BGH of
June 26, 1989, 108 BGHZ 134, 143; BGHZ of Nov. 20, 1990, 44 NJW 634, 636 (1991),
with further references; KARL LARENZ & CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, SCHULDRECT, BT,
II at 454 (13th ed. 1994); Oechsler, supra note 211, at n.77; Schiemann, in
Erman/Schiemann, BGB, § 826 n.15 (10th ed. 2000).
214 See BGHZ 8 (1952), 83 (87); BGHZ of June 20, 1963, 16 NJW 1872, 1873
(1963); Oechsler, supra note 211, at Nr. 61 BGB; H6nn & Dtnneweg, in: Soergel, sec.
826 Nr. 54 BGB (12th ed. 1998); Schiemann, in Erman, § 826, Nr. 11 BGB (10th ed.
2000); LARENZ & CANARIS, supra note 213, at 455.
215 BGHZ 10 (1953), 228 (233); BGHZ of Jan. 6, 1970, 15 WM 1021, 1023 (1970);
BGHZ of Mar. 5, 1975, 20 WM 559, 560 (1975); BGHZ of Sept. 24, 1991, 44 NJW
3288, 3289 (1991); BGHZ of Apr. 14, 1986, 31 WM 904, 906 (1986); BGHZ 129, 136
(176); Larenz & Canaris, supra note 195 at 454; Thomas, in Palandt, supra note 202, §
826 n.9 with further references; Schiemann, in Erman, § 826 n.14 BGB (10th ed. 2000);
Staudinger, in Hk-BGB, § 826 n.9 (2d ed. 2002); BANKRECHTSHANDBUCH., supra note
199, at § 40 n.65; LG Augsburg of Sept. 24, 2001, 46 WM 1944, 1946 (2001) -
Infomatec II; and M611ers & Leisch, 46 WM 1642, 1662 (2001).
216 See Thiimmel, supra note 197; Reichert & Weller, 35 ZRP 53, 59 (2002).
217 See Reichert & Weller, supra note 216, at 59.
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hoc statements. 218 Publishing the ad hoc statement, the board of
directors expresses that it considers the published facts to have an
influence on the price of the shares. The board is aware that the
positive "advertising" of ad hoc statements will raise the price of
the share and that investors will consequently buy the shares for
too high a price. 219  The BGH adopted this rationale without
restrictions. 20 Such a positive act is lacking with omissions of or
in ad hoc statements. It is not possible to simply assume the intent
to harm another person. But, if an omission is at issue, the intent
to harm will be difficult to discern, since the board of directors is
unlikely to make known an intention to harm another party.
In the special laws dealing with liability in capital market law,
the legislature has also shifted the burden of proof for proving
fault. 22' Arguably, the legislature's reason for this shift was that
otherwise the ability to prove fault is rendered practically
impossible and that it concerns facts that lie exclusively within the
knowledge of the tortfeasor. Intentional acts can be assumed if
circumstantial evidence demonstrates the intent to harm. In the
United States, Rule 1 Ob-5 of the SEA requires scienter on the part
of the tortfeasor 2 As in German law, recklessness is sufficient,
and it can be assumed if the defendant knows the risk or it is
obvious that the purchaser or seller is deceived.223 U.S. courts
have also found an act to be reckless if facts could have been
easily published but were not.224 In Greebel v. FTP Software
218 4th FFG, Official Legislative Documents, BT-Drs. 14/8017, at 93; WpHG, § 37b.
This was, in fact, true according to the facts in the judgment of the LG Augsburg.
219 See M61lers & Leisch, 23 ZIP 1995, 1997 et seq. (2002); see also Fuchs &
Diihn, 2 BKR 1063, 1068 (2002) (dissenting with the lower court OLG Miinchen of Oct.
1, 2002, 23 ZIP 1989, 1993 (2002)); see Part I.2.b) (3) - Infomatec II.
220 BGHZ of July 19, 2004, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004); BGHZ of July 19,
2004, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004); BGHZ of July 19, 2004, II ZR 217/02, ZIP
2004, 1604).
221 See supra Part III.3.d.
222 For a U.S. federal court opinion regarding scienter, see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
223 For U.S. federal court opinions regarding scienter, see AUSA Life Insurance Co.
v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990).
224 Keiman v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980). To verify recklessness,
certain facts may be used as evidence. For example, access to information that
contradicts previously published information or the publication of such contradictory
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Inc., 2 25 the First Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals listed
circumstances that may lead to a presumption of an intentional act,
including: insider trading, discrepancies between internal reports
and publications, temporal proximity between an alleged incorrect
publication or an omitted publication and a subsequent publication
of contradicting information, bribery by a senior executive, fast
settlement in similar lawsuits, and self-interested transactions such
as payments or protection of one's job.226 There must also be a
causal link between the tortfeasor's intention and the resulting
loss.
Conditional intent can be assumed in disclosure or expertise
cases if the tortfeasor, although unaware of providing incorrect
information, is aware that the basis for the information is so
insecure that the risk of incorrect information is particularly great.
In this case, although not aware of the immorality itself (the
incorrectness of his information), there is an awareness of the risk
(insufficient method of verification) that creates the small
possibility that the predicted facts will come true. Positive
knowledge of the risk is thus sufficient to presume the existence of
conditional intent, as clarified by a systematic comparison with
section 142, paragraph 2 of the BGB. Cases in which the
tortfeasor provides information with no knowledge at all as to
whether his information is correct can be problematic. The
information serves a self-interest. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2 nd Cir. 2000);
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
225 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Circuit makes clear the facts that imply
scienter:
This court has considered many different types of evidence as relevant to show
scienter. Examples include: insider trading (discussed below); divergence
between internal reports and external statements on the same subject; closeness
in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure
of inconsistent information; evidence of bribery by a top company official;
existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and the
company's quick settlement of that suit; disregard of the most current factual
information before making statements; disclosure of accrual basis information
in a way which could only be understood by a sophisticated person with a high
degree of accounting skill; the personal interest of certain directors in not
informing disinterested directors of impending sale of stock; and the self-
interested motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Cf Cox ET AL., supra note 159, at 739.
226 For an example of reckless behavior on EM.TV's side, compare Thomas
M6llers, 48 WM 2393 (2003).
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tortfeasor does not know that his information is incorrect. But
since the information is not unified, it is clear that there is a risk
and high probability of incorrectness.
In the Infomatec cases, the BGH already considered the
defendants' actions immoral: a grossly incorrect ad hoc
communication fundamentally violates the minimum legal
standards; moreover, the defendants were willing to use every
means available to mislead prospective investors.227
D. Proposed Developments (de lege ferenda)
1. Director Liability
The fourth FFG only established the liability of the individual
issuer and has abstained from introducing a special legal basis for
a claim directly against the board of directors. 8 Restricting
claims to gross negligence prevents the unlimited liability of the
director, and company executives. This has been criticized,
because the other shareholders have to pay the damages indirectly
and claims will very often go unfulfilled if the company goes
bankrupt.229  The Baums-Commission explicitly opted for the
introduction of claims against the board of directors. ° By the
same token, both the legal literature 23 1 and the 64th DJT
(Association of German Jurists),232 call for establishing a claim
against the board of directors. Finally, the government has put
personal liability on the agenda in its ten-point action program.233
227 BGHZ of July 19, 2004, I1 ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004).
228 Thus only tort law claims or claims arising out of a pre-contractual relationship
can apply. See WpHG, para. 37b-c.
229 Baums, 166 ZHR 375, 379 (2002).
230 Baums, supra note 78, BT-Drs. 14/7515, n.186 as sec. 77 para. 1; cf. Baums,
Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental Europe: the Example of
Germany, Law Working Paper No. 4, at 17 (2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract_id=345020.
231 Horn & Kramer, supra note 53, at 271; Fleischer, supra note 4, at 99; 55 NJW
2977, 2979 (2002); Spindler, 47 DSTR 1576, 1580 (2002).
232 Resolutions of the 64th DJT 2002 in Berlin, 55 NJW 3073, 3082 (2002).
233 See Press Release, Secretary of Justice Brigitte Zypries and Secretary of Finance
Hans Eichel (February 25, 2003), available at http://bmj.de sowie http://www.thomas-
moellers.de/materialien; see also FRANFURTER ALLEGMAINE ZEITUNG, Feb. 26, 2003, at
9; FRANKFURTER ALLEGMAINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 7, 2003, at 20.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Systematic and teleological arguments, in particular, suggest
the need for the introduction of personal liability: 234 Personal
liability of the board of directors can already be found in general
tort law.235 In addition, personal liability against those responsible
for the registration statements has been established in the case of
incorrect statements. The notion of prevention is of particular
importance as directors and executives tend to deceive the general
public in times of financial difficulty.
2. General Liability Claim for False Information
a) Further Claims de lege lata
There has been little discussion as to whether the violation of
periodic disclosure duties and of the duty to disclose directors'
dealings lead to liability. The discussions that have addressed the
consequences, particularly for the claims of investors against the
board of directors for violations of the Corporate Governance
Code,236have proven controversial. Some opt for granting
claims;237 others deny liability for an incorrect prospectus as the
compliance declaration cannot be compared with a prospectus.238
Furthermore, the highest German federal court, the
Bundesgerichtshof, demands an "unregulated area" with respect to
the application and development of the principles of general civil
liability for incorrect statements.239 The introduction of the
234 Cf. Fleischer, supra note 135, at 102; see also 2 BKR 608, 612 (2003).
235 Section 823, para. 2 BGB; § 826 BGB.
236 AktG, § 161 states:
Declaration on the Corporate Governance Code: The executive board and
supervisory board of exchange-listed companies shall declare once a year that
the recommendations of the "Government Commission on the German
Corporate Governance Code" published by the Federal Ministry of Justice in
the official section of the electronic Federal Gazette have been and are being
complied with or which of the Code's recommendations are not being applied.
The declaration shall be made permanently accessible to stockholders.
Id. See also supra note 16 and the sources cited therein.
237 K6ngden, supra note 24, at 463, 474; Ulmer, 166 ZHR 150, 169 (2002,); see
also Hopt, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 27, 55 (Peter Hommelhoff et al. eds., 2002).
238 See Seibert, 56 BB 581, 584 (2002); Ihrig & Wagner, 56 BB 789, 792 (2002);
Borges, 32 ZGR 508, 531 (2003); Abram, 14 ZBB 41, 44 2003.
239 BGHZ 89, 337 (341).
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Corporate Governance Code and the compliance declaration of
section 161 of the AktG were not meant by the legislature to
extend liability.24° Finally, one should not forget that the courts
would either have to develop individual requirements for liability
or adapt them to the existing system of liability,24' actions which
should be taken by the legislature. Therefore, creating liability
through the development of the law would likely prove difficult.
For example, the BGH has most recently refused to apply the
principles of prospectus liability as a basis of liability for incorrect
ad hoc communications.242
b) On the Way to a General Liability Claim for
Incorrect Capital Market Information
The Governmental Commission on Corporate Governance has
called for the creation of a general liability claim for incorrect
capital market information and has made proposals for a
rewording of sections 79-83 of the B6rsG (draft of the
Commission report), section 400 of the AktG was used as a
blueprint for this proposal. According to the draft proposal, the
board of directors, not the company, is liable for incorrect
publications if the courts find that such publication was intentional
or reckless. 243 The 64th DJT is more restrictive in its approach and
has called for liability for incorrect obligatory publications. 2" The
240 See Seibt, 46 AG 249, 256 (2002).
241 According to the principles of general liability for incorrect information all
forms of negligence are sufficient.
242 BGHZ of July 19, 2004, II ZR 402/02, 25 ZIP 1593 (2004); BGHZ of July 19,
2004, II ZR 218/03, 25 ZIP 1599 (2004); BGHZ of July 19, 2004, II ZR 217/02, 25 ZIP
1604 (2004). For comments, see Leisch, 25 ZIP 1573 (2004).
243 AktG, § 79, para. 1 reads:
The members of the executive board and the supervisory board of exchange-
listed companies shall be liable according to the subsequent provisions for
intentional or grossly negligent misrepresentations of the company's condition
including its relations to affiliated companies in presentations or overviews on
the financial situation, in lectures or disclosures in the shareholders' meeting if
such presentation is apt to influence the share price materially.
Report of the Commission, Corporate Governance, BT-Drs. 14/7515, n.186. The whole
text is available at http://www.otto-schmidt.de/corporategovernance.html. For a
"cautious agreement" with this contention, see Fleischer, Gutachten Fftr den 64 DJT
113 (2002).
244 Resolutions of the 64th DJT 2002 in Berlin, No. 1.9., 55 NJW 3073, 3082
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government is also examining the introduction of personal liability
for incorrect capital markets information.245 The Transparency
Directive proposal of March 26, 2003246 states that a violation of
the duty to correctly publish financial data annually, semi-
annually, and quarterly must lead to personal civil liability. The
demand of the High Level Group on European Company Law for
collective liability of all members of the board of directors for the
annual report and the annual Corporate Governance compliance
declaration represents one step towards this goal of liability and
accountability.247
Two arguments are often made in favor of the introduction of
general liability for incorrect capital market information. First, the
risk of circumvention has to be taken into consideration: if an
issuer is not obliged to publish ad hoc statements, and publishes
important facts in an ad hoc statement, it is possible to apply
section 37c of the WpHG analogously. 248 But such an analogy
must fail if the information is then misrepresented at the
shareholder's meeting or at a press conference and, under these
circumstances, the investor is also to be protected. 249  It is
preferable to look at the cases where liability can arise by legal
norms rather than the less predictable approach of relying on the
courts to further develop the general civil law principles on
incorrect statements.
But one has to be aware of the risk of over-regulation.
When examining U.S. Rule lOb-5 of the SEA251 in a comparative
(2002), according to the proposals of Fleischer, supra note 243, at 112.
245 Press Release, supra note 233.
246 Transparency Directive, supra note 14, art. 7; see also supra Part 111. .b).
247 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament - Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward of May 21, 2003, COM (2003) 284 at 19; cf
Maul, 55 DB 27, 28 et seq. (2003). See now for a liability claim of the company against
its directors, Art. 50b proposal for a directive amending the directive concerning the
annual accounts of certain types of companies, COM (2004) 725 final.
248 See M611ers & Leisch, 5 NZG 112, 113 (2003).
249 Fleischer, supra note 243, at 112.
250 See Von Rosen, FRANKFURTER ALLEGMAINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 14, 2003, at 18
(showing the risk of overregulation and doubting a general liability claim); Miilbert, 54
JZ 826, 836 (2002); Veil, 32 ZGR 365, 400 (2003).
251 HAZEN, supra note 47, at 569. See also Steinhauer, Insiderhandelsverbot undAd
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law perspective,252 it is important to recognize the fact that the
courts have liberally interpreted this anti-fraud rule as a general
liability claim with its own unwritten requirements.253 The U.S.
Supreme Court has considerably restricted the implicit liability
claim. It has held that to be eligible for damages, the claimant
must: (1) be either a buyer or seller of the securities;254 (2) prove
an intentional act;255 and, (3) prove that the defendant acted with
intent to deceive.256
There is a real risk that if the requirements for a general
liability claim are vague the courts will refrain from applying
them. This was the fate of former section 88 of the BrrsG, which
had not been applied by courts and public prosecutors. If every
negligent statement in front of the press might result in enormous
damage claims, the boards of directors would likely limit their
current way of informing the public. Limitations of information
would not help the efficiency of capital markets.
Given the possibly high number of claimants, it is important to
include a rule that only a material misrepresentation will lead to
liability, such as can be found in U.S. law. 7 Although, it is true
that the test of materiality is already relevant to the test of
causation, overzealous claimants would be deterred from suing if
the materiality of the misrepresentation would be one of the
elements of the provision.258
hoc Publizitat 149 (1999); Resolution Recommendation, supra note 107 (discussing Rule
1Ob-5).
252 Fleischer, supra note 243, at 111.
253 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946) (the first case to
make a decision in this direction); see also MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. et al.
404 U.S. 6 (1971); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
(upholding the decision in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co)..
254 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
255 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
256 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
257 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that
materiality of a fact is given if there is sufficient probability that a rationale investor
would consider this fact to be important); HAZEN, supra note 47, at 596.
258 Thomas M.J. Mrllers, 14 ZBB 390, 407 (2003).
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c) Draft on an Act Concerning Capital Market
Information Liability
(Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetzes)
The Ministry of Finance most recently submitted a draft of the
Act Concerning Capital Market Information Liability259 in which
numerous suggestions were implemented. Though the draft has
been stopped, it will most probably become law at some point in
the future.
The newly amended section 37b of the WpHG extends the
issuer's liability to members of a managing, administrative, or
supervisory board. The issuer can now be held liable for public
notifications or communications about business transactions that
affect a large number of persons. Consequently, practically all
information duties on the secondary market are included. Yet,
liability for oral statements remains limited to those statements
made at shareholders' meetings and information meetings
arranged by the issuer such as analysts' meetings hosted by the
company. Moreover, the notification or the concealed fact must
be significant to the valuation of the shares. Finally, liability is
limited to intent and gross negligence; in accordance with stock
exchange prospectus law,26 ° the burden of proof is shifted with
regard to default. Unlike previous provisions concerning liability
for incorrect ad hoc communications, the recently amended
provisions refrain from stipulating what constitutes proof of
causation; namely, that the investor's decision was provoked by
the incorrect communication. As in the domain of stock exchange
prospectus liability, it is sufficient that the investor bought or sold
at a price influenced by the incorrect information; as for causation,
the "Anlagestimmung" created by the incorrect information
suffices. Nevertheless, the assumption that the investor purchased
on the basis of the incorrect information is only valid for six
months.
The amendment of section 37b of the WpHG results in a
noticeable expansion of liability as board members can now be
held liable for grossly incorrect ad hoc communications. Liability
259 See Thomas M.J. M61lers, Juristische Fakultht, available at http://www.
thomas-moellers.de/materialien (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
260 B6rsG, § 45.
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does not depend on whether the purchase or sale of the share was
caused by the incorrect communication. The legislature now
follows the road paved by legal scholars. 6'
The draft act also introduces a maximum limit on liability with
respect to managing and supervisory boards; liability remains
unlimited with respect to the company itself. The maximum limit
of liability only applies in cases of gross negligence. Director and
officer insurance must provide an adequate deductible in order to
ensure that the prevention intended by the law is not undermined.
The draft act proposes a maximum limit of liability of four times
the individual's yearly remuneration per violation. If the entire
loss exceeds this limit, the draft provides for pro-rata
compensation."'
d) Comparison with United States law
The United States Congress introduced a limitation on
liability63 in the Reform Act of 1995.264 Under this act, damages
shall not exceed the difference between the purchase price of a
security and its mean trading price during the ninety days
following a corrective disclosure. The reason for the ninety-day
rule was to accommodate the fact that the price over-reacts if
incorrect information is corrected and therefore self-corrects to the
true price.265 The ninety-day rule has been criticized as being too
long, since the market reacts quickly to the relevant information.266
261 Mdllers & Leisch, WM 46 WM 1648, 1652 (2001); Fleischer & Kalss, 57 AG
329, 333 (2002); see also supra I1.4.2)b).
262 For more details see M61lers, Die Infomatec-Entscheidungen des BGH -
Marksteine auf dem Weg zu einer Haftungfir Kapitalmarktinformationen, 60 JZ Vol. 2
(2005).
263 Subsequently, lawsuits have frequently been filed if the share prize changed after
a press release was submitted by the issuer. See Thomas W. Antonucci, The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act and the States: Who Will Decide the Future of
Securities Litigation?, 46 EMORY L.J. 1237 (1997); see also Michael Y. Scudder, The
Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L.
REv. 435 (1997) (illustrating the misuses and discussing the implications for securities
class action litigation).
264 15 U.S.C. § 78u -4 (e) (2000).
265 See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5
Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REv. 7, 9 - 11 (1994).
266 See Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule lOb-5
Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A Forward-Looking
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Furthermore, the limitation on liability has been considered unfair
in situations in which the issuer has acted in a fraudulent
manner.2 67  Section 21 D(e) does not address cases in which an
incorrect ad hoc communication has been corrected after six
months.268 Finally, it remains unclear whether the issuer is entitled
to bring forward the fact that the general market risk shall be
excluded from the loss adjustment.269 Market risks have no
relation to the influence of the incorrect communication or the
price when a correction is made.27" By means of section 21 D (e)
of the SEA, only claims made pursuant to Rule 1 Ob-5 of the SEA
are limited. Therefore, claims made on the basis of common law
and state law can still be aimed at rescission.27'
Interestingly, in Germany, this provision supports an argument
for the expansion of liability rather than a limitation. In principle,
the German legislature is only willing to award the difference
between prices to the plaintiff. Therefore, it does not relate to the
difference between the actual price and a hypothetical price had
the incorrect communication not been made.27 The investor is
entitled to claim the difference between his purchase or sales price
and the average stock exchange or market price within thirty days
after the disclosure of the false statement or concealed
information. Moreover, personal liability is limited to C 4 Million.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether both parties are
entitled to establish that the real loss was higher or lower. The
explanatory statement submitted with the draft act currently
permits this, yet, there is no indication for this in the wording of
the draft act itself. It remains to be seen whether this will be
clarified in the final version of the law.
Assessment, 51 Bus. LAW. 1203, 1212 (1996); see also Scudder, supra note 263, at 460.
267 See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 366-67
(1996); see also ROBERT B. THOMPSON, "SIMPLICITY AND CERTAINTY" IN THE MEASURE
OF REOCVERY UNDER RULE 1OB-5 1177, 1199-1200 (1996).
268 See Scudder, supra note 263, at 463-64.
269 See id. See also Bradford Comell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory
to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 897-911
(1990).
270 See Antonucci, supra note 263, at 1252-53.
271 Id. at 1272; see also Stemman & Gray, 958 PLI/CORP 757, 806 (1996).
272 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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In general, the amended version of the act specifies the scope
of liability more accurately than the previous law. Thus, as a basic
principle, it is no longer possible to recover the sales revenue and
return the shares (out-of-pocket). This is understandable, as the
claimant is not obliged to establish that the purchase of the shares
was caused by the incorrect information. The claimant must bear
the market risk. Because the legislature assumes that individuals
bought on the basis of false information, it can also be expected
that they may sell the shares when the information is corrected. In
that case, the issuer is not responsible for a loss caused by the
investor holding onto the shares. The legislature thereby creates a
joint responsibility that is dogmatically not to be considered with
respect to contributory negligence but with respect to the loss.
Reciprocally, the plaintiff can still claim rescission if he has
any special relation273 to the issuer. As in the United States,274 it
still remains possible to claim the full amount of the capital
investment as loss on the basis of section 826 of the BGB and
section 45 of the B6rsG.
Indeed, the issuer is, as a general principle, only obliged to
reimburse the difference between prices when there is a loss.
Moreover, the issuer can establish that there was less of a loss by
claiming that the lower price of the share was not caused by the
incorrect information but by other market risks. Here, it would
have been helpful if the legislature had included a definition of
out-of-pocket loss as a first step.275 But, because the legislature
assumes causation in the purchase decision, it could be argued that
this higher market risk has to be borne by the issuer, and thus the
argument for causation by other market risks cannot be brought
forward as a defense. The issuer, however, carries the burden of
proof for the lower loSS.2 7 6 Therefore, issuers have to provide
comprehensive scientific reports.
Section 37b of the WpHG avoids the weaknesses of section 21
(D)(e) of the SEA. Unlike United States law, section 37b of the
273 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussing how rescission involves the fiduciary duty of the issuer).
274 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
275 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
276 See THOMPSON, supra note 267, at 1200-02 (concurring with respect to U.S.
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WpHG provides a period of thirty days within which the
correction will be considered. Notwithstanding the fact that the
amended version of section 37b of the WpHG allows for more
damages than just out-of-pocket losses, if the act is unethical,
section 826 of the BGB is still applicable. A limitation to the out-
of-pocket loss is thereby avoided.277 Moreover, the issuer is
entitled to bring forward evidence that a lower loss has occurred.
Thus, the rationale that the assumption of causation is limited to
six months appears consequential. The introduction of this new
provision takes a giant step towards permitting civil liability for
instances of dissemination of false information on the capital
market.
3. Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision -
Duty of Publication
In Germany, most investors' lawsuits have failed since often
the claimants have not been able to establish the requisite elements
of causation or intent. In the Telecom case, the limitation of
claims was a major problem; the preliminary proceedings by the
public prosecutor were not followed up very eagerly.278 Until
now, investors could not count on support by the public prosecutor
or the BaFin (Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision).
In fact, section 8 of the WpHG imposes an obligation of secrecy
on the employees of the BaFin. In the work of the BaFin, it is
common practice to keep the names of the companies violating the
duties under the WpHG secret. The BAFin's practice of refusing
to publish, even publicly tried sanction decisions results in the
BaFin protecting these companies. This protects the tortfeasors
and makes it harder for the investors to claim their damages. The
protection of the tortfeasors cannot be the goal of a public agency
whose main purpose is the supervision of ad hoc statements to
prevent the formation of incorrect prices on the basis of incorrect
information.
277 Id. See also Fleischer, 57 BB 1869, 1872 - 1873 (2002) (showing how the
alternative approaches discussed by Thompson are adapted to German law).
278 It is in dispute whether the registration statements were incorrect when the
Telecom AG increased its share capital in June 2000 because possibly the assets in real
estate were evaluated improperly. The limitation of the claims after three years which
has passed in summer 2003 has been too short to verify the individual prerequisites for a
claim. The public prosecutor in Bonn is still investigating.
[Vol. 30
2004] GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 333
In France the COB (now the L'Autorit6 des Marchds
Financiers) is allowed to publish its sanctions in the media form of
their choice.279 This possibility is of great importance, as it makes
the names of the tortfeasors publicly known. If a fine is imposed,
the addressee has to bear the costs. Article 14, paragraph 4 of the
Market Abuse Directive 6/2003/EC imposes the duty on the
member states to enable supervisory agencies to publish their
measures and sanctions; section 8 of the WpHG will therefore
have to be amended.28 °
Fortunately, this was amended by the introduction of the
Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz. 28  A newly amended section
40b of the WpHG now provides that the BaFin can publish
unchallengeable measures on its website if violations of the
WpHG occur. Yet publication is only permissible if it is necessary
to remedy deficiencies and only if no unreasonable loss is at stake
for the persons involved or the financial markets. Consequently, it
is feared that the BaFin will reluctantly exercise its powers in the
face of these limitations.
4. Representative Proceedings
Finally, the federal government plans to introduce an act
concerning representative proceeding with regard to investors
(Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz or KapMuG). As a result,
the high risks and costs of litigation arising from the complex
hearings of evidence and the complex capital market questions
involved are to be reduced. The Oberlandesgericht (Higher
Regional Court) ex officio appoints a plaintiff to represent
similarly situated plaintiffs. All other plaintiffs receive third party
summons to attend the proceedings and are thereby enabled to
participate in the representative proceeding. Unlike U.S. class
action claims, the right to be heard is secured for all plaintiffs in
this proceeding.282
The draft of the act concerning representative proceedings with
regard to investors has been criticized by legal scholars who argue
279 Art. - 621-15 C. mondt. Fin.
280 M1llers, 14 ZBB 390,408 (2003).
281 BT-Drs. 15/3493 of July 1, 2004, supra note 9.
282 See Press Release, Secretary of Justice Brigitte Zypries, available at
http://www.bmj.de (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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that a claim by one investor does not suspend the period of
limitation for the other investors that do not participate in the
lawsuit. These investors are still forced to file a lawsuit in order to
suspend the period of limitation.283
IV. Summary
This Article supports the assertion that capital market law in
Germany and other European member states still has to be
developed. This includes not only the development of the duty to
disclose for ad hoc and periodical statements, but also the
development of effective civil law and supervisory sanctions.
Germany, the European Union's largest market, leads other
member states in the development of liability laws designed to
strengthen confidence in the capital market. The new draft of a
general liability provision section 37b of WpHG is strongly
correlative to United States law, particularly the fraud-on-the-
market theory. The shorter correction period and the rules of
evidence in the new draft exceed U.S. requirements. If the drafts
of a Transparency Directive and Prospect Directive are passed,
then there will be, along with the Market Abuse Directive, three
directives that align the requirements and the consequences of the
capital market information duties to a previously unknown extent.
This would be an important step forward in the protection of the
investors and the capital markets in general.
283 See Braun & Rotter, 4 BKR 296, 297 (2004).
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